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Since the Congress of Berlin modern economic imperialism
has been definitely recognized as the dominant factor in in
ternational relations. No longer does it appear as the old
colonialism of the mercantilists but now, transformed by the
Industrial and Commercial revolutions, it has become "the
process of discovering foreign market, of establishing perma
nent foreign economic interests, and of exercising political
pressure upon the regions in which the economic interests
exist."1

Economic penetration, commercial treaty, protect

orate, and annexation are the keywords of imperialisms new
program.

Although its chief exponents are still to be found

in Europe, imperialism is not a sectional movement. It is,
instead, a stage which results when a highly developed
economic organization piles up a surplus and forces manufac
turers and capitalists to look for new markets and for new
investments. This economic condition was first evident in
European states.
In the post Civil War period the United States was reach

1. Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy; a Study
in American Imperialism (New York, 1925), p. XV of Introduction. Carlton J. H. Hayes in A Political and Social
History of Modem Europe (New York, 1931), Vol. II, p. 601,
describes imperialism as "the quest for profitable invest
ments for capital, rather than of farms and new homes for
settlers,'1 while J. A. Hobson, quoted in Dollar Diplomacy,
p. XV, says that it "implies the use of the machinery of
government by private interests, mainly capitalist, to se
cure for them economic gains outside their country."
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ing the stage which is a forerunner of foreign economic
imperialism. Her population rose from 51,443,321 in 1860
to 62,622,250 in 1890.2

A large percentage moved to the

cities during this period and the number of cities over
10,000 more than trebled.3
farms more than doubled.^

At the same time the number of
The Homestead Act made Western

land available to any one who would live on it and the fron
tier which in 1860 extended through central Minnesota south
ward, "bulging beyond the 97th meridian in portions of Kansas
and Texas," was practically gone by 1890.

An important

factor in the rapid settlement of the West was the extension
of the railway system. A bill for the building of the Union
Pacific and the Central Pacific which were to unite to form
the first transcontinental railroad, was approved in 1862 and
after this time railway construction advanced rapidly, reach-

2. Census Reports, 1860, Population, p. 597; Abstract of the
Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 5.
3. Census Reports ,* 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statis
tics, Introduction, p. XVIII-XIX; Abstract of the Eleventh
Census, 1890, pp. 25-50. Causes given by Walter Wilson
Jennings, A History of Economic Progress in the United
States (New York, 1926), p. 589, are growth of manufacturing, advance in ease of transportation, increase in
wealth, good wages, regular employment, opportunities for
self-feetterment, and companionship.
4. Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 60, number of
farms in 1860 were 2,044,077 while in 1890, the number was
4,564,641.
5. Isaac Lippineott, Economic Development of the United States
(New York, 1921), p. 308; Frederick Jackson Turner, The
Frontier in American History (New York, 1920).

3.
g
ing a total of 165,562 miles in 1890.

Likewise, the high

prices of farm products, the labor surplus following the
Civil War, the development of mining in several Western
states, and the influx of immigrants in the last were
instrumental in causing the disappearance of the frontier.
The introduction of farm machinery, the improvement in
methods of grain transportation, and specialization in agri
culture resulted in a great increase in the output of
cereals. In the period between 1860 and 1890, production of
wheat mounted from 173,104,924 to 468,373,968 bushels; pro
duction of corn from 838,792,742 to 2,122,327,547 bushels;
production of oats from 172,643,185 to 809,250,666 bushels;
and production of barley from 15,825,898 to 78,332,976
7
bushels.
By 1875 American wheat was beginning to influence
the world market, and by 1880 an era of depression had set
in in French, British, and German agriculture, partly due to
8

the low prices brought about by this new competition.

In

an effort to offset .American and Russian competition at a

6. Census Report, 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statistlcs, Introduction, p. XIII, total miles of railroad in
1860 were 30,793.67. Abstract of the Eleventh Census,
1890, p. 218, number of miles of railroad in 1890 was
163,562.12.
7. Lippincott, op.cit., p. 398. Charles Austin Beard and Mary
R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York,
1927), p. 274, believes this specialization to be due to
the increased use of machinery, "the stimulus of business
enterprise, and the pressure of competition."
8. Melvin M. Knight, Harry Elmer Barnes, and Felix Flugel,
Economic History of Europe (New York, 1928), p. 441.
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time when cost prices were rising, Germany enacted the
Tariff Law of 1879.

As the decline in prices of cereals

continued in Germany, the duties on foodstuffs—mainly meat
and grain—were increased in 1885 and again in 1887. France,
too, during this period set out to develop a more general
system of protection for her farmers. Her efforts resulted
in the Tariff of 1892.9

As a result of the growth of protec

tion in Europe and the constantly increasing agricultural
surplus, by 1890 the American farmer was forced to look for
other markets.
Industry, intrenched behind high tariff walls, with a
broad domestic market, immense natural resources cheaply se
cured, and a plentiful supply of cheap labor coming from
Europe, was able to make gigantic strides during this period.
The number of manufacturing establishments increased from
140,433 in 1860 to 322,638 in 1890 and the annual value of
manufactured products at the same time rose from $1,885,861,676
10
to $9,056,764,996.
Up until 1880 the domestic market was
great enough to absorb all manufactures, only fourteen per
cent of the total exports being manufactured goods in that
year.

However, in order to keep invested capital employed at

9. Frederick Austin Ogg, Economic Development of Modern
Europe (New York, 1917), pp. 161-166, 195, 205, 303-311.
10. Eighth Census, 1860, Manufacturing, p. 729; Abstract of
the Eleventh Census, 1890, p. 109.

5

the point of most economical production, it was necessary
to find a sale for all it could produce and this fact com
pelled American manufacturers to keep searching for greater
markets for their trade.11

The emphasis in the makeup of

American exports shifted from raw materials to manufactured
products after 1880 and from that time the importance of
Europe as a market began to decline.

After 1885, commerce

with North America, South America, Asia, and Oceania commenced
to mount.
As a result of the quickening of industry capital accumu
lated rapidly.

The wealth of the United States had more than

quadrupled between 1860 and 1890, and had increased one-third
12
between 1880 and 1890.
As the wealth increased, it tended
to become concentrated in the hands of a few. By 1890 it was
13
held as follows:

11. Banker*s Trust Company, Our United States, quoted in
Nearing and Freeman, op. cit., p. 24^51
12. Eighth Census. 1860, Mortality and Miscellaneous Statis
tics, p. 295; Abstract of the Eleventh Census, 1890,
p. 189.
1890—$65,037,091,197
1880
§43,642,000,000
I860
#16,159,616,068
13. Richard Franklin Pettigrew, Triumphant Plutocracy, the Story
of American Public Life from 1870 to 1920 (New York, 1921).
p. 122.
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During the post war period this capitalist class had in
vested their money chiefly in American industries "but by
the end of the nineteenth century they were ready for invest
ment abroad.14 They had reached the stage which in Europe
had forced investors into Africa and Asia.
Since 1844 when Caleb Cushing had been sent to open
China, the foreign policy of the United States had been in
creasingly concerned with the promotion of her trade abroad.
As a result, when the shift from export of raw materials to
the export of manufactured goods made it necessary for Ameri
can manufacturers to turn from Europe as a market to the
undeveloped countries which had need for such products, they

14. Beard, op. cit., Yol. II, p. 197.

7

called upon the government of the United States for help.
At the same time .American capitalists were finding govern
ment support essential in their attempted economic domina
tion of foreign territories and were beginning to exert a
growing pressure for the expansion of the commercial empire
of the United States through the political domination of
territory in the form of spheres of influence, protectorates,
and dependencies.

Although the most of the United States and

Alaska had been acquired by the American government since
1800 and attempts had been made to obtain Cuba, San Domingo,
Haiti and the Danish West Indies, the annexation of foreign
territory for the reasons urged by the imerican imperialists
represented a distinct departure in foreign policy. We find
therefore, that by 1890 the United States was arriving at the
stage recognized by Europeans at the time of the Congress of
Berlin.

Economic penetration of backward countries had al

ready begun and the stage was set for territorial acquisi
tion, the political phase of imperialism.
As early as 1873 Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State,
showed his understanding of the importance of Hawaii as a
source for raw material, a field for American investment, and
"a'resting spot in the mid-ocean, between the Pacific Coast
and the-vast domains of Asia, which are now opening to com15
merce and Christian civilization."
Americans had been in

15. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52nd Cong., 2d Sess.

8

terested in Hawaii since these Islands were discovered byCaptain Cook, an English navigator, on one of his exploring
1 fi
voyages in the North Pacific.
On his last voyage Captain
Cook had learned the value of the fur trade between China
and the Northwest coast of America and it was this trade
that first made the Islands well-known and gave them a place
of importance in the commercial world. In 1786, Joseph
Barrell, a Boston merchant, formed a stock company with a
capital of #50,000 for trade in furs, sandalwood, cocoanut
oil and other products of the Pacific islands the the Alaskan
and Oregon coasts.

Two vessels, the Columbia, commanded by

Captain Bobert Gray, and the Lady Washington, commanded by
Captain John Kendrick, left Boston in 1787 and were the first
17
American ships to visit Hawaii.
During the same winter
there came to the Islands the Eleanora and the Fair American
commanded by Captain Simon Metcalfe and his son who had been
trading for furs on the American coast.

To punish the

natives for stealing a boat and putting to death the sailor
in it, Captain Metcalfe fired upon a large number who came
out to trade, killing more than one hundred.

A few days

later a chief retaliated by killing all of the men on the

16. This was possibly a rediscovery as there is some evidence
to show that Juan Gaetano, a Spanish navigator, dis
covered them in 1555. If so, he made no effort to benefit
from his discovery.
17. Edmund Janes Carpenter, America in Hawaii, a History of
United States Influence In the Hawaiian Islands (Boston.
1899), pp. 29-31.

9.

Fair American except Isaac Davis who escaped alive. Davis
and John Young, the boatswain of the Ileanora, also a cap
tive, were taken under the protection of Kamehameha, who
made them his advisers.

They were instrumental in helping

him to force the entire Archipelago to acknowledge him as
18

Kamehameha I, the first of the line of Hawaiian monarchs.
It was in this period that Captain George Yancouver
made his three visits to the Islands.

The Nootka Sound con

troversy which nearly involved Spain and England in war was
adjusted when Spain yielded and signed the Nootka Convention
at Madrid in 1790.

Captain Yancouver was sent to receive the
1Q
restitution of the territory from Spain, and to explore.
His winters were spent in the Sandwich Islands where he re
ceived the cession of Hawaii to Great Britain for protection
against enemies, with the understanding that the native
religion, government, and social system should not be dis
turbed.

As this cession was not accepted by England nothing
90

resulted from it.

The publication of accounts of these voyages familiarized
sea-men with the Islands so that every ship in the Pacific
began to stop there and Honolulu became a regular market for

18. Carpenter, op. oit., pp. 11-16.
19. Edmond S. Meany, Vancouver*s Discovery of Puget Sound,
Portraits and Biographies of the Men Honored in the Naming
of Geographic Features of Northwestern America (New York.
1907), pp. 10-12.
20. Ibid., p. 14.
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supplies. Many fur-traders came to secure provisions, to
obtain Hawaiians for sea-men, or to spend tlie winter
dressing their furs and buying sandalwood.

Among them were

a large number of Americans and by 1816 they were so in
fluential that their arguments caused the Hawaiian king to
El
expel the Russian American Fur Company from his country.
The fur traders had discovered the value of the sandalwood
in Hawaii and by 1810 it had became the predominant interest
there.

The importance of this trade was largely due to con

ditions peculiar to the Islands.

As the chiefs realized the

demand for the wood they made it a government monopoly and
forced the people to cut it, usually without compensation.
Since it cost them practically nothing they were willing to
pay for their purchases in lavish amounts of sandalwood.

As

the wood was easily sold in China where it was in demand for
incense in joss houses, the fur trader found it to be a
valuable asset in commerce.

So many of these traders were

from Boston that the Hawaiians usually spoke of imerica as

21. The Russian American Fur Company, chartered by the Tsar
of Russia, had secured a monopoly of the fur trade in
Alaska and wished to establish trading posts in Califor
nia and the Hawaiian Islands in order to get supplies.
Their representative, Dr. Scheffer, whose actions were
later repudiated by the directors of his company,
attested to make a settlement in Hawaii and to get
Kauai away from the control of Kamehameha. Ralph S.
Kuykendall, A History of Hawaii Prepared Under the Direc
tion of the Historical Commission of the Territory of
Hawaii (Hew York, 1926). pp. 92-96.

11.

22
Boston and of the Americans as Bostonians.

The outstand

ing American engaged in this trade was John Jacob Astor
of New York.

Astor had been carrying on commerce with

China for sixteen years when he discovered the possibilities
of sandalwood in connection with his China trade. Part of
his cargo from New York was usually exchanged for furs along
the American coast and the remainder for sandalwood in
Hawaii.

Astor*s great resources enabled him to sell goods

at very low prices on short credit, giving him an advantage
over others who were often obliged to take notes payable in
sandalwood.

As his cargo was usually the first on the

Canton market, he received good prices for it and bought
teas, silks, nankeens, spices, etc. which he then bartered
to the Hawaiian chiefs and to the Russians and Spaniards
along the American coasts in return for sandalwood and furs.
These were again sold in Canton and this time the Chinese
cargo was usually taken back to New York. Astor was engaged
in the selling of sandalwood during its best years, from
1816 until 1828.

Among other traders who dealt in sandalwood

were Captain Kendrick, Captain William Cole, Captain Brewer,
and Roquefeuil.

As early as 1890 Kendrick's men began to

22. The Indians of the Northwest usually called all Americans
Bostonese for similar reasons.

IE

buy sandalwood and ship it to the Canton market.

Much

later, in February 1823, Captain William Cole came to the
Sandwich Islands in the Paragon, owned by Josiah Marshall
of Boston.

They brought with them the frames of two

schooners which were set up at Honolulu and used for gather
ing sandalwood. John Dominis, second mate of the Paragon
was destined to become the father-in-law of the Hawaiian
Q,ueen Liliuokalani.

Charles Brewer, another member of the

Paragon* s crew later became master of a vessel and engaged
in the Hawaiian trade, finally setting up a commercial house
in the Islands.24 Roquefeuil was commander of an expedition
sent out by M. Balguerie of Bordeaux with the object of
getting goods for the China trade without the expenditure of
money.

This was in 1816, toward the end of the fur trade,

and Roquefeiul had difficulty in getting a cargo of furs,
OK

so he began to buy sandalwood also.

In 1821 and the first

half of 1822, the exports of this product amounted to from
#350,000 to #400,000 at $10 per picul while in the year
1836 only $26,000 worth was sold at $7 per picul.26

This

23. S. E. Morison, Maritime History of Massachusetts (Boston,
1921), p. 51; George Vancouver, Voyage of Discovery
(London, 1821), Vol. I, pp. 172-3.
24. Carpenter, op. cit., pp. 37-39.
25. Camille de Roquefeuil, A Voyage Round the 7/orld between
the Years 1816-1819. in New Voyages and Travels (London,
1821), Vol. XXX, pp. 3-63.
26. One picul equals 133-1/3 pounds.
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decline was due to the destruction of the sandalwood forests.
No care was taken in securing wood for sale, the quality hecame poor, and the price diminished.

A decisive factor in

their disappearance was the tax collection of 1827 enforced
by the king and chiefs in an attempt to pay debts of |150,00G
owed to Americans.

MA

tax of one half a picul of sandalwood

or four dollars in money" which was levied "on every native
of the Sandwich Islands," resulted in the ruin of the forests
by the cutting of 25,000 more piculs of wood and left many
27
chiefs still in debt.
It was at this time that Astor de
cided to withdraw from the Pacific trade after twenty-eight
28

extremely successful years.

During the period of the sandalwood trade many whaleships began to stop in the Islands for rest, repairs, and
supplies.

From forty to sixty American whale-ships were some

times found at anchor at one time in Honolulu harbor in 1823.
During the period between January 1, 1836 and the end of
1841, four-fifths of the three hundred and fifty eight
American vessels anchoring in Honolulu harbor were whalers,
and each of these spent an average of seven hundred dollars
29
while on shore.
The discovery of valuable whale fisheries

27. Charles Brewer, Reminiscences (1884), pp. 27-31, quoted
in Kenneth Wiggins Porter, John Jacob Astor, Business Man
(Cambridge, Mass., 1931), Vol. II, p. 667.
28. Porter, op. eit., Yol. II, pp. 640-647, 662-670, 11951197.
29. Carpenter, op. cit., p. 36.

14.

in the Okhotsk sea and in the Arctic ocean north of Bering
strait gave an impetus to the industry which was at its
height between 1840 and 1860.

As Japan was closed to com

merce the whaling vessels continued to come to Hawaii for
supplies, an average of four hundred arriving each year.
Most of the .American whale fishing had been transferred to
the Pacific and a large majority of these ships were from
the United States.

The American promoters of this fishing

discovered that a great saving in time and money could be
made by storing the whale oil in Hawaii for trans-shipment in
other vessels, and the Islands became more essential to the
industry.

The whale-ships at the same time contributed to

Hawaiian economic life through import duties and port dues
which helped the government treasury, by furnishing work for
the merchants and mechanics, and by securing to the farmers
a market for their meat and vegetables. In 1859 the dis
covery of petroleum dealt a severe blow to whaling and the
scarcity of whales together with the destruction of whalingvessels in the Civil War and in the ice pack of 1871, further
30
diminished its importance.
In 1820 the American government considered her interests
great enough to warrant the appointment of Mr. John C. Jones

50. James M. Callahan, "Hawaii", The Encyclopedia Americana
(New York, 1932).
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to go to the Islands as the "Agent of the United States for
commerce and seamen.Disturbances caused by deserting
sailors together with the question of the sandalwood debts
led to the sending of two American warships, the Dolphin
and the Peacock, on a visit of friendly inspection in order
to settle the disputes.

After adjusting the conflicting

claims, Captain Thomas Ap

Catesby Jones, acting for the

United States, made a treaty with the Hawaiian government
providing for perpetual peace and friendship between the two
countries and for the protection of American trade in the
Islands.

This was signed in December 1826, and although it

was never ratified by the government of the United States,
32
the Hawaiians considered it as binding upon themselves.
About the time of the beginning of the whaling industry
American influence was strengthened by the coming of the
missionaries. They arrived at an opportune moment for
Kamehameha II had just overthrown idolatry and Hawaii was a
country without a religion.

This gave the American evangel

ists an opportunity to intrench themselves strongly in
Island life and politics.
In 1809 Captain Brintnall had brought Ophuahaia
(Obookiah), a Hawaiian boy, to New Haven, and it was his de
sire for the Christianizing of his homeland that inspired

31. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol.VIII, p. 4.
32. Ibid., 31-33.

16

the sending of missionaries there. Obookiah was educated
through the kindness of Americans and returned to his
home as a missionary.

The New England church became inter

ested in the movement and in 1819 a band was organized in
Boston and sent to Hawaii.

Soon a chapel and a school-

house were built, the language was reduced to writing, and
spelling books were printed for the people.
and Christianizing movement had begun.

The civilizing

Eight years later,

four hundred forty native teachers were helping the Ameri
cans in their work and in 1836, thirty two additional
missionaries were sent out.33 The missionaries soon became
of prime importance to the chiefs and were their advisers
on almost all questions. Because of their civil influence
they were strongly opposed by Richard Gharleton, the British
consul-general to Hawaii and the Society Islands.

He saw

that they were introducing republican principles which would
draw the Islands closer to the United States and which he
feared would eventually make them an appendage of that repub
lic.34
During the next decade foreign interests became so pre
dominant in Hawaii that some people began to believe she
would soon lose her independence.

In 1836 while the guns of

the Actaeon were commanding Honolulu, Charleton induced the

33. Carpenter, op. elt., pp. 20-29.
34. Ibid., 62.

king to conclude a treaty with the British government
providing for the protection of the persons and property
of British subjects residing in the Islands.

At the same

time he used every opportunity to attempt to secure the
intervention of the British government in Hawaiian affairs.
France who in this period was posing as the defender of
Catholic missionaries throughout the Pacific, now took ad
vantage of the Hawaiian persecution of the Catholics as a
pretext for interference in the government. Following the
example of the English, Captain Laplace used the guns of
j

the frigate Artemise to force Kamehameha to sign two
treaties, one providing for the safety of the Roman Catho
lics and the other for a general treaty of friendship and
55
commerce.
Under these circumstances it seemed advisable
to the king to obtain an acknowledgment and guarantee of
Hawaiian independence from the three great powers, France,
Great Britain, and the United States.36
In December 1842, King Kamehameha III sent two commis
sioners to Washington to call the attention of Secretary
Webster, and through him, of the government of the United
States, to the relations of the two countries and to suggest
a definite recognition of the Hawaiian government as an

35. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII,
pp. 33-35.
36. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII,
p. 6.

18.

independent civilized power.

The commissioners were suc

cessful and in a few days Secretary Webster expressed the
attitude of the State Department toward the acquisition of
foreign territory saying that "the Government of the
Sandwich Islands ought to be respected; that no power ought
either to take possession of the islands as a conquest, or
for the purpose of colonization, and that no power ought to
seek for any undue control over the existing government or
any exclusive privileges or preferences in matters of com37
merce."
President Tyler made their mission the subject of
a special message to the Senate on December 31, 1842, and
upheld Secretary Webster's pronouncement which was the first
public statement of the greater interest of the United States
in Hawaii.

He spoke in opposition to foreign control as

follows:38
"It can not but be in conformity with the inter
est and wishes of the Government and the people of
the United States that this community...should be
respected and all its rights strictly and conscien
tiously regarded.... Far remote from the dominions of
European powers, its growth and prosperity as an in
dependent state may yet be in a high degree useful to
all whose trade is extended to those regions, while
its near approach to this continent and the inter
course which American vessels have with it—such
vessels constituting five-sixths of all which annually
visit it—could not but create dissatisfaction on the
part of the United States at any attempt by another
power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to

37. Sen. Hep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. Ill,
Appendix 2, p. 67.
38. Ibid, 63.
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take possession of the islands, colonize them, and
subvert the native government."
The United States was soon given an opportunity to
carry out her implied promise to protect the Islands.

This

was occasioned by the unfriendly visit of the British ship
Carysfort on the pretext that the right of a British sub
ject had been infringed.

Threatening to use force, if nec

essary, Lord George Paulet demanded what amounted to the
cession of Hawaiian sovereignty to Great Britain.

Seeing no

other way out, King Kamehameha agreed, stipulating that it
be subject to any arrangement that might be entered into by
commissioners to be appointed to lay the matter before
Queen Victoria.

Lord George Paulet accepted the cession and

raised the British flag over the Islands.

At once the King

sent a message to President Tyler asking him to use his in
fluence to persuade the Queen to withdraw from Hawaii.

It

happened that before the Paulet affair took place, Mr.
Webster, in view of the recent French aggressions and of the
attitude of Charleton, had sent a note to Edward Everett,
United States minister at London, calling his attention to
Mr. Tyler's recognition of Hawaiian independence, and stating
that the President "would exceedingly regret that suspicion
of a sinister purpose of any kind on the part of the United
States should prevent England and France from adopting the
same pacific, just, and conservative course toward the govern
ment and people of this remote but interesting group of

20

Islands."39

Mr. Everett replied that Lord Aberdeen had

expressed the intention of Great Britain to recognize the
independence of Hawaii.

Furthermore the British govern

ment had informed the French ambassador at London that
England could not agree on any encroachments on the Sandwich
Islands and the ambassador replied that none were contem
plated by France.
At this juncture the very emphatic protest of Secretary
of State Legare was sent to Edward Everett and presented to
the British government.

Mr. Legare pointed out that the

United States had no wish "to plant or to acquire colonies
abroad" but that the peculiar relations between Hawaii and
ourselves might make us "feel justified, consistently with
our own principles, in interfering by force to prevent its
falling into the hands of one of the great powers of Europe.
The appeal of Mr. Legare and of the Hawaiian commissioners
which Kamehameha sent to the Queen, was successful and the
action of Lord Paulet was disavowed.

Edward Everett in a

dispatch to the State Department concerning the disavowal
stated
"Had intelligence been received here of Lord
George Paulet*s occupation of them before her promise

39. Carpenter, op.cit., p. 82; Sen.Ex.Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong.
2d Sess., Vol. VIII, pp. 37-49.
40* Sen. Bep. No. 681, 55th Cong. £d Sess., Vol.Ill,
Appendix 2, p. 67.
41. Ibid., p. 77.
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was given to recognize them, England, I think, would
not have given them up. As it is, an understanding
between the great European powers, amounting, in
effect if not in form, to a guaranty of their inde
pendence, is likely to take place. This is the only
state of things with which the United States could be
content. As it will be brought about without involv
ing us in any compacts with other powers...."
In November, 1843, a convention was entered into between
France and Great Britain, recognizing the independence of
Hawaii.42

The Sandwich Islands were at last admitted to the

category of civilized nations.
American influence now tended to become predominant.

For

several years the United States had been trying to negotiate
a treaty with Hawaii giving rights to her similar to those
gained by France in 1839. She did not succeed until 1850.
At this time the first fully completed treaty between the
United States and Hawaii was proclaimed.

It resembled the

commercial treaties negotiated by the United States with other
nations and was to remain in force except as modified by
later conventions, until the annexation of Hawaii.43

American

influence was increased when the French consul in 1849 sup
ported by two warships, seized Honolulu and the French
government refused to interfere. In self-defense the Hawaiian
king signed a secret proclamation placing the Islands under

42. Sen.Ex.Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. ¥111,
pp. 41-65.
43. Ibid., pp. 75-82.

American protection.4'4

Mr. Webster immediately returned

this document to the King and warned the American minister,
Mr. Severance, not to allow any direct interference by the
United States navy as it was the province of Congress to
declare war.

In an official communication inclosed at the

same time, Mr. Webster stated that the United States would
uphold Hawaii's independence in spite of the attempts of the
great commercial powers of Europe to take the Islands.

He

pointed out that they were ten times nearer the United States
than Europe and that five-sixths of their commerce was with
this country. As a threat he added that the Navy Department
would be ordered to keep a fleet in the Pacific sufficiently
large as to protect the American and Hawaiian interests there
Copies of this letter were sent to the French government and,
unable to mistake its meaning, they quickly disclaimed any
intention of alienating Hawaiian independence.
After 1850 events in the United States were at work
changing public sentiment toward Hawaii.

The acquisition of

Oregon Territory in 1846 and of California in the Mexican War
had brought America nearer Hawaii and had increased the inter
est in trade.

The discovery of gold in California brought

44. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII,
pp. 84-95; Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 3d Sess.,
Vol. Ill, Appendix 2, pp. 77-79.
45. Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII,
pp. 95-97.
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many people to the western coast and many of them became
interested in expansion saying that "manifest destiny" re
quired that the United States include all of North America
and Hawaii.

The Hawaiians now became alarmed.

Bands of

filibusters had been organized in California to conquer
Mexico and perhaps Hawaii. In the Islands themselves an
annexationist sentiment had grown up, resulting in political
disturbances which King Kamehameha III feared were the fore
runners of revolution.

As a result, when petitions were

presented him asking that a treaty of annexation to the
United States be drawn up, he consented.

This treaty, made

for use in case of emergency, was never signed by Kamehameha
as he died in 1854. Had he signed it, it would not have been
approved by the President of the United States because of
three clauses: one providing for #300,000 a year to be paid
to the chiefs, one calling for payment of $75,000 yearly for
ten years for educational purposes, and one providing for
ACL

the admission of Hawaii as a state.

Before the decline of whaling another industry, sugar
production, was coming to the front.

As early as 1802 a

Chinese had made sugar on the island of Lanaii. Since the

46. Sen. Rep. Ho. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. II, pp. 4041; also House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess.,
Vol. XXVII, pp. 141-165.

24.

soil and climate were adapted to the growing of sugar cane,
cultivation on a small scale began.

About 1830 when it be

came evident that the sandalwood trade was gone, the chiefs
started to develop the natural resources of the Islands.

Up

until this time the natives had been discouraged in industry
by the land system and the absolute control of the chiefs
over their labor.

Foreigners could neither buy land nor rent

it on favorable terms and it was not until 1839 that the first
successful sugar plantation was established.

At that time an

American firm of Ladd and Company was granted a fifty year
lease of a tract of land at Kola, Kauai with the right to hire
natives, raise cane, and manufacture sugar.4-7

By 1840 the ex

ports from January until September included sugar worth
48
$18,000 and syrup and molasses worth #73,000.
During the
next few years several plantations were started and when the
settlement of California furnished a convenient market for
Hawaii, it became evident that this was to be the big industry
of the Islands.
There were two handicaps in the trade with California.
One of these was the competition of Philippine sugar and the
other, the United States tariff placed on this import. Many
of the planters were Americans and they desired annexation to
the United States in order to avoid the payment of a tariff.

47. Kuykendall, op.cit.. p. 201.
48. Ibid., 140.

The Hawaiian government believed that the same end could be
secured by a reciprocity agreement.

Practically all of the

Hawaiian-American relations from this time until 1898 consist
of the attempts of the sugar planters to secure and maintain
a satisfactory market in the United States.

Reciprocity

agreements were proposed by the Hawaiian government as early
as 1848 and 1852 but were unfavorably received in the United
States.

In 1855 a third reciprocity treaty was negotiated

and although favored by President Pierce and Secretary of State
49
Marcy, it failed to receive a two-thirds vote in the Senate.
During the Civil War the question of a treaty was set aside
by Mr. Seward, then Secretary of State.

The need for reci

procity was not so pressing as the sugar industry was exceed
ingly prosperous and the amount of sugar exported by Hawaii
rose from 1,500,000 pounds in 1860 to 15,000,000 in 1865.
After the war prices dropped, a crisis came, and people began
to discuss reciprocity again. With the consent of Mr. Seward
a fourth treaty was drawn up, ratified by the Hawaiian govern
ment, and approved by President Johnson.

At this time there

was some talk of annexation. King Kamehameha V was in poor
health and had named no successor.

Edward McCook, United

States Minister Resident in Hawaii, wrote that if the American

49. Sen• Rep. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. II, pp. 45-48.
50. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 225.
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government, upon the King's death, would indicate any de
sire to annex Hawaii, a plebiscite would show the residents
of the Islands to be unanimously in favor of the move. Mr.
McCook in this letter summarized the interests of America
in the Islands as follows:
"They are the resting place, supply depot, and
reshipping point of all our American whaling fleet.
"They are the sources from which the Pacific
States receive all the sugars they consume.
"The greater part of the agricultural, commer
cial, and moneyed interests of the islands are in the
hands of American citizens.
"All vessels bound from our Pacific coast to China
pass close to these shores."51
He saw a menace to American interests in the attempt being
made by the Hawaiian government to secure a commercial treaty
with Japan, and in the English sympathies of the governing
officials.

The desirability of a lawful and peaceful annexa

tion of the Islands, providing the natives were willing, was
expressed by Secretary Seward in 1867.

American sentiment,

however, was unfavorable at this time as elections were
approaching and the political parties, still concerned with
economy and retrenchment, were unwilling to consider national
extension.

In 1870, the fourth reciprocity treaty which had

been pending for three years, was rejected by the Senate.
The condition of the sugar industry continued to grow
worse causing a business depression as well. This was

51. Sen. Ex. Doc. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. VIII, p. 135.
52. Ibid., 135-146.
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heightened "by the decline of whaling.

As King Kamehameha

was growing more feeble, Mr. Henry Peirce, new minister to
the Islands, suggested in a letter to the president that
the time for closer political union between the United
States and Hawaii was drawing near.

Although Mr. Grant

considered this letter important enough to send to the
Senate, that body took no action.55 Upon Kamehameha1s
death, Lunalilo, by birth the highest of the chiefs, suc
ceeded to the throne.

The agitation for annexation was con

tinued both by "many persons in the islands representing
large interests and great wealth," and in Imerica by "those
of influence and of wise foresight who see a future that must
extend the jurisdiction and the limits of this nation...."54
The Hawaiian government, Mr. Peirce believed, would never
propose annexation however much the people as a whole wished
it. If the great interests of the country demanded annexa
tion, the planters, merchants, and foreigners would probably
induce the people to overthrow the government and establish
a republic. This republic would then ask for admission into
55
the Union.
The death of Lunalilo in 1874 made it necessary for the
Hawaiian Legislature to choose a new king.

One candidate

53. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. VIII,
pp. 12-16.
54. Ibid., 15.
55. Ibid., 149, 150.
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for the throne, Kalakaua, was favored by most of the
foreigners, especially the Americans, and "by a large number
of the natives while the other, Queen Dowager Emma, widow
of Kamehameha IT, was supported by English interests and
by many Kanakas.
nine to six.

Kalakaua was elected by a vote of thirty-

This decision precipitated a riot among the

followers of Queen Emma which was quelled only by marines
landed from the British and American warships anchored in
the harbor.

Kalakaua favored closer relations with the

United States and in the autumn of 1874, although opposed by
the French and British commissioners, he set out on a visit
to Washington. Success in obtaining a reciprocity treaty
was hoped for by offering Pearl river harbor in exchange.
This concession was not required, however, as an agreement
passed Congress without it.

The mew treaty, for which

Hawaii had striven twenty-seven years, provided that unre
fined sugar, rice, and other Hawaiian products should be ad
mitted into the United States duty free; enumerated a list of
American products to be admitted to Hawaii duty free, and
stipulated that as long as it remained in force the Hawaiian
king would not make any grants of territory or of special
privileges to another power.

After seven years the treaty

could be ended by e ither party by giving one year* s

56. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
pp. 285-288.
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notice.

The treaty was a "conspicuous exception" to the

commercial policy of the United States at this time.

The

spread of manufacturing in the West had' strengthened the
protectionist sentiment and in 1875 tariffs were being re
stored to their war-time amounts.

The cause which had finally

brought the United States to sign the treaty was the growing
trade of Hawaii with Australia, New Zealand, and British
Columbia. The State Department had heard that the entire
sugar crop of 1876-77 was to be sold to the British and it
felt that unless the United States made some concessions,
Hawaii would in time become an English colony.58 This was
an action which the American government could not permit.
Even the War Department had recently begun to show an interest
in their future and in May, 1875, under confidential instruc
tions from Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, Admiral Schofield
had made an investigation of the Sandwich Islands in order
to ascertain the defensive possibilities of their ports,
examine their commercial facilities, and collect all the in
formation possible on other subjects win reference to which
we ought to be informed in the event of a war with a powerful

57. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. XXVII,
pp. 405-409.
58* Sen. Bep. No. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. II, pp. 103-113
and Congressional Record, Vol. 4, Part 2, 44th Cong.
1st Sess., pp. 1420-1422.
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maritime nation...."
The results of the free admission of sugar into the
United States were surprisingly far-reaching.

The treaty

not only advanced economic development in the Islands, but
also changed their relations with the rest of the world,
and led to their final loss of independence. In reality a
customs union was formed including Hawaii and the United
States.

Reciprocity granted the equivalent of a bounty to

the Hawaiian sugar planters for sugar remained the same
price on the American market.

Some objections were made by

Great Britain and Germany, both claimed the same privileged
treatment by Hawaii as was given to the United States by
the treaty of 1875.

Although England*s demands were backed

by the "favored nation" clause in her treaty of 1852 with
Hawaii, Secretary Blaine declared them "inadmissible" and
the Hawaiian government backed him by upholding America*s
right, according to the treaty, to exclusive privileges.
Hawaii immediately became a field for very profitable
investment of American capital and an extraordinary increase
in sugar planting took place.

In 1883 Consul Daggett sent a

statement from the Saturday Press of Honolulu showing the

59. Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 77, 52d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. VIII,
pp. 150-155.
60. Ibid., p. 16.
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principal sugar plantations in Hawaii.

Forty eight of the

sixty nine plantations were owned "by Americans.OA

The

comparative valuations of sugar interests by nationalities
were as follows:
1 space = 1/2 million dollars
American

rxr-r-T i-rrm-n-rn-ri i i i i

British

czrr3=nzrn=n

German

•—r-i

Hawaiian c=t>
Chinese

a,

J. Seott in his REPORT UPON THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES WITH FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR THE YEAR 1877, gives
us some interesting suggestions of the immediate effects of
go
the reciprocity treaty.
The price of real estate, he tells
us, advanced rapidly. In 1875 the assessed valuation of the
real estate of the kingdom was $6,490,600.

By 1876, "in

anticipation of the ratification of the treaty," it had in
creased to $7,624,061 and by 1877 it had mounted to
$8,500,000.

This increase was mostly in sugar and rice lands.

61. Consular Report No. 36, Dec. 1885, pp. 396-398.
Value of total sugar interests
$15,886,800
American
$10,235,464
British
3,180,050
German
970,046
Hawaiian
641,240
Chinese
560,000
62. Commercial Relations, 1877, pp. 622-632.
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One half of the Lahaina plantation had recently sold for
|500,000 when before the signing of the treaty the entire
plantation would hare brought much less than that amount.
Many new plantations were being established, most of the
capital invested belonging either to American citizens or
to Americans who had become naturalized citizens.

Claus

Spreckels was probably the leading example of capitalistic
investment in Hawaiian sugar.

A refiner in California, he

opposed reciprocity until the treaty went into effeet and then
took advantage of it to make another fortune. In 1884 he
owned the majority of one plantation in Hawaii and had minority
interests in four others. He, together with his friends, was
at this time able to control one-fourth of the sugar crop.
The sudden leap in sugar exports to the United States
is shown in the following graph

Sen. Rep. No. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. II, p. 112.
64. Sugar exports to the United States as follows:
1870—14,557,711 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1870, p. 261.
1871—18,135,500 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1872, p. 606.
1878—38,399,862 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1878, p. 804.
1880—63,427,972 lbs., Commercial Relations of the United
States, 1880 and 1881, p. 1124.
1883—114,107,155 lbs., Commercial Relations, 1882 and 1883,
Vol. II, p. 837.
Reports from the Consuls of the United States, No. 81,
July, 1887, p. 88: 1886—216,223,615 lbs. (practically)
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As all of the labor and land were absorbed by the sugar in
dustry, it became necessary to import almost everything
used in the Islands.

The amount of imports from the United

States increased rapidly during this period, making an im-

65
mense jump "between. 1876 and 1883.

.J

J 4

65. Hawaiian imports from the United States:
1875—$947,260, Commercial Relations, 1877, p. 626.
1876—1771.407. Loc. cit.
1877—J1,545,156, Loc. "cit.
1878—§1,889,759, Commercial Relations, 1878, p. 802.
1880—$2,671,823, Commercial Relations of the United
States, 1880 and 1881, p. 1122.
1881—#3,239,836, Loc. cit.
(Cont. p. 35.)
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The growth of the new merchant marine made up of vessels
built expressly for the service, was encouraged by this
shipping.

American mercantile houses transacted the en

tire commerce both ways and "by 1894 were carrying annually
about $12,000,000 worth of merchandise at high rates.
After 1883 the reciprocity agreement which had brought
this increased prosperity became subject to termination at
a year1s notice. Hawaiian sentiment ardently desired its
extension for the progress of the Islands was dependent on
the sugar industry which in turn depended on reciprocity.
Many petitions for the abrogation of the treaty were sent to
the Forty Seventh Congress by various American interests and
a joint resolution providing for its termination was reported
66

from the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The remarks

of Representative Randall L. Gibson of Louisiana are probably
typical.

He attacked the treaty on two scores, first, that

it had had no beneficial effect on our commerce, and second,
that it had no political advantages for our country.

He

pointed out that at the time of the passage of the act the

65. (Cont.)
1882—#3,599,380, Commercial Relations, 1882 and 1883,
Vol. II, p. 839.
Data for 1883 from Consular Report No. 44, August 1844,
p. 690.
1883--#4,048,466
Data for 1886 a computation based on statistics in
Consular Report No. 81, p. 89.
1886—$3,717,811.
66. Cong. Rec., Vol. XIV, Part 2, 47th Cong. 2d Sess., p.1242.

Secretary of Treasury had said that the increased exports
to Hawaii would be equal to the duties surrendered on
Hawaiian exports.

This had not worked out, Mr. Gibson

claimed as in 1881, for example, there was an increase of
$2,072,609 in American exports over the 1875 record, while
the duties surrendered amounted to $2,400,000, resulting in
"an undisputed donation of that amount as a subsidy out of
the Treasury of the United States to the sugar and rice
art

planters of Hawaii".

This would soon break down every sugar

refining industry in the East, West, and South and would be
a great discouragement to the American planters. Further
more, Mr. Gibson claimed, we gained no political advantage
that we did not already have, therefore there was no advantage
for us in reciprocity with Hawaii.

Many others felt this way

also and when the treaty was sent to the Senate it decided,
in secret session, to stipulate the cession of Pearl Harbor
for naval and commercial purposes.

The convention had not

yet been ratified when Mr. Cleveland became President.

In

his second annual message he committed himself in favor of
the renewal of the convention for Hawaii had become practi
cally an "outpost of American ccmmeree and a stepping stone
68

to the growing trade of the Pacific."

The renewal

67. Gong. Rec., Vol. XIII, Part 7, Appendix, p. 29-37, 47th
Cong. 1st Sess.
68. Robert McElroy, Grover Cleveland, the Man and the States
man, an Authorized Biography (New York, 1925), Vol.II.p.47.
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passed and when the amendment concerning Pearl Harbor was
ratified by Hawaii in 1887, the first step was taken by
69
the United States in securing territorial rights in Hawaii.
England quickly realized the value of the cession and pro
tested. She suggested that the United States join in the
Franco-English agreement of 1843 by which those two nations
agreed never to seize Hawaii, either directly or as a pro
tectorate.

Secretary Bayard refused to join in guaranteeing

the neutrality of the Islands and declared in a note to the
British premier that there was nothing in the cession of
70
Pearl Harbor to impair the political sovereignty of Hawaii.
As a result, nothing came of the British protest.

President

Cleveland, in fact was not averse to the annexation of Hawaii
if the inhabitants of the Islands really wanted this step
and his biographer, McElroy, says that there is no indica
tion that he did not agree with the views of his Secretary
of State Bayard, who later declared: "The obvious course was
to wait quietly and patiently, and let the islands fill up
up with American planters and American industries, until they
should be wholly identified in business interests and political

69. Foreign Relations, 1887, No. 381, 382, 383, 384; and
Foreign Relations, 1888, Vol. I, No. 610.
70. Foreign Relations, 1888, Vol. I, No. 614, 615, 618. In the
same year, 1877, the United States opposed a suggested
British loan of two million dollars to Hawaii with the
government revenues as security. Allan Nevins, Grover
Cleveland, A Study in Courage (New York, 1932), p. 550.
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sympathies with the United States. It was simply a matter
71

of waiting until the apple should ripen and fall."

Most of Kalakaua*s reign was spent in political strife.
The cause for this trouble was the underlying difference
between the political views of the king and those of the
party who opposed him. Kalakaua believed that a king had
absolute power as was permitted by the Hawaiian constitution
of 1864. This constitution gave the king complete control
of the cabinet through his power to appoint and dismiss
ministers, also practical control of the legislature through
his power to appoint them to public office.

In addition to

making use of these privileges, Kalakaua took the right to
change the constitution as he desired and to influence elec
tions.

By 1880 he had working with him, two adventurers,

Walter Murray Gibson, professional politician and editor,
and Celso Cesar Moreno, a professional lobbyist. Through
their influence, the king in 1880 executed a coup d'etat and
appointed Moreno premier, causing much dissatisfaction.

For

the first time the opposition to him united, forcing him to
remove Moreno. In 1882 Gibson became premier and it was
understood that he had the backing of Spreckels, who was
72
rapidly becoming the power behind the throne.
One of the

71. McElroy, op. cit., II, p. 48.
72. In 1877 Mr. Spreckels had brought about the resignation of
the Cabinet in order to secure one which would grant him a
long term water privilege on the island of Maui.
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first measures brought before the Legislature was an act
to convey about 24,000 acres of the crown lands of Wailulu
to Spreekels, for the purpose of compromising his claim to
an undivided share of the crown lands purchased from the
half sister of Kamahameha IV. The cession of the island of
Wailulu to Spreekels and the distrust of Gibson caused a
reaction among the natives and the election of many Reform
members to the next Legislature.

Kalakaua, meanwhile, had

had himself re-crowned, much to the disgust of the high
chiefs and many foreigners who considered the ceremony as
another step in the king*s plans to make himself absolute.
He was now aspiring to extend a Hawaiian protectorate over
the other Pacific islands, sending commissioners to various
islands and warning the Great Powers of Europe against any
further annexations.

As his absolutist schemes advanced, he

came into conflict with Mr. Spreekels who by 1886 had between
$600,000 and |700,000 invested in the Hawaiian government.
The trouble was brought to a crisis by Kalakaua*s attempt to
secure a loan from London. Spreekels and the cabinet opposed
this loan unless the debt to the sugar planter was paid
first.

The Legislature's vote was S3 to 14 against the

cabinet and Spreekels in disgust severed his connections with
the government.

Acting as his own prime minister with the

assistance of Gibson, the king now began a period of misrule

40.
73
which, culminated in the revolt of 1887.
Kalakaua's opposition believed that the government of
Hawaii should be a constitutional monarchy with the power
in the hands of the people.

Early in 1887 they organized

as the Hawaiian League. Two factions developed, the majority
desiring a limited monarchy and the radical minority favor
ing the establishment of a republic and annexation to the
United States.

In case the king refused to grant a constitu74
tion, all were to join in overthrowing the monarchy.
The
publication of reports of scandals in connection with the
granting of opium licenses was the signal for a revolution
which resulted in the constitution of 1887 making the king
responsible to the cabinet, widening the franchise so as to
include resident foreigners of English or American descent,
and placing the election of nobles in the hands of voters of
75
foreign birth or foreign ancestry.
As Kalakaua was strongly
opposed to this constitution he set out to abolish it.
Political unrest became greater and a revolution was attempted
or actually took place nearly every year between 1887 and
1895.

In 1889 the United States marines, for the second time

since the establishment of the Hawaiian monarchy, were called

73. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
p. 179-215.
74. Kuykendall, op. cit., p. 270.
75• House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
p. 193-197.
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upon to intervene in an uprising in order to protect Ameri
can property.

This insurrection against the government,

which was led by Robert W. Wilcox and Robert Boyd, two halfcaste Hawaiians, was defeated on the day it began. It was
thought to have been instigated by Liliuokalani in an
attempt to dethrone her brother Ealakaua who had lately
76
named her as his successor.
The years between 1887 and 1890 were golden years for
the sugar planters of Hawaii.

The export of sugar continued

to increase rapidly, dividends on plantation shares were
large, and the price of sugar land was high. The sugar was
sold to the Spreckels refinery which had a monopoly of sugar
refining on the Pacific coast and forced them to accept
slightly less than the entire amount of the remitted duty.
Before 1890 the planters were not united and accepted varying
prices for their sugar but after that time they combined and
made contracts for a year or more, all planters to receive
the same price.

In 1889 Spreckels came up against the Ameri

can Sugar Refining Company, a combination controlling produc
tion in the east.

The eastern company established a rival

refinery in California and Spreckels built one in Philadelphia.
In 1892 Spreckels joined the .American Sugar Company and as
there was not enough business on the Pacific coast for two

76. Carpenter, op. cit., p. 158.
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refineries, his rival, the branch of the Sugar Trust, was
discontinued, giving him even more control over the Hawaiian
planters.

By this time, however, other factors had begun to

undermine the prosperity of the sugar-growers.

There was a

surplus in the United States* Treasury so large that the
administration decided to devote part of the McKinley Tariff
Bill to reducing duties on commodities.

Choosing sugar, the

most remumerative item of the old tariff, they repealed the
duty on it and provided for a bounty of two cents per pound
to be paid to sugar-growers in the United States. Short of
complete destruction, the McKinley Bill of 1890 was probably
the greatest calamity that could have descended upon the
Hawaiian sugar men. It removed their advantage and placed
them on the old basis of twenty years before.

The price of

sugar is said to have fallen in one day after the passage of
the Bill from $100 to #60 per ton.77

Consul-General Severance

in 1892 reported that the operation of the McKinley Bill had
caused a loss of over $5,000,000 to the planters in the year
no

following its passage.

This resulted in a depression in the

Islands and the desire to restore the old profitable relations
with the American market led directly to the Hawaiian revolu
tion of 1893 and to the treaty of annexation arranged by the

77. C. Whitney, The Hawaiian Islands, p. 194, quoted in
F. W. Taussig, Seme Aspects of the Tariff Q.uestion
(Cambridge, 1915), p. 61.
78. Consular Reports, No. 142, p. 412.
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Harrison administration.
King Kalakaua died in 1890 while in the United States
and his sister Liliuokalani ascended to the throne.

Her

political views resembled those of her brother but her friend
ship was with England rather than America and she opposed the
Pearl River clause of the reciprocity treaty.

Although she

disliked the constitutional limitations on her power, no
great strife occurred until 1892.

The parties in the Legis

lature of 1892 were so evenly divided that long debates
ensued over the principal questions, which concerned the
Queen's control of the cabinet, an opium license bill, and a
bill to give a franchise to a lottery company.

The Queen

favored all three measures and all three were defeated.
Determined to remove the cabinet whose members included
nearly all the principal business men of Hawaii, she appealed
to the supreme court for their sanction of such a step, and
they decided that the cabinet had been automatically dismissed
by the death of Kalakaua.

The Queen now began a long struggle

over the composition of a new cabinet.

She persisted in sub

mitting to the Legislature the names of men whose character
made them unfit for the ministry.

The continued opposition

of the Legislature finally farced her to agree to an acceptable
list of fairly capable men, a distinct triumph for the Reform
Party.

This was unsatisfactory to Liliuokalani who desired a

weak cabinet so that she could revise the constitution of 1887
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as her next step toward reestablishment of absolutism.
Just before the close of the Legislature in 1893, during the
absence of some of the Reform Party, the opium and lottery
bills were brought up again and passed and the cabinet dis
missed.

In return for her support of the lottery bill the

Queen was to be allowed to proclaim a new constitution
restoring the old despotic authority to the ruler. It was
to be directed against the interests of the Americans as it
provided that all white men, unless married to native women,
were to be absolutely debarred from the suffrage.

The

Americans and other whites were seriously alarmed for they
foresaw that the final result of such a policy wouia be either
to drive them from the Islands or to place their property at
79
the mercy of anyone who wished to take it.
As news of the
new constitution began to spread, the excitement became so
great that some of the Queen*s new cabinet, fearing a revolu
tion, refused to sign it, and the matter had to be postponed.
In order to prevent violence of any kind the Queen called out
the royal troops plus an unauthorized force of five hundred
men and secured control of the capital.
The cabinet feared for their personal safety in the event
of mob violence and appealed to the citizens for aid. Some

79. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
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of the citizens, feeling that the legal authorities would
be unable to handle matters, should further trouble arise,
issued a call for those in opposition to the Q,ueen to form
troops and to organize a committee for protection. A group
met in the office of William 0. Smith and provided for the
appointment of a committee of public safety of thirteen to
maintain the peace.

The committee called a mass meeting for

Monday afternoon, January 16, to decide what steps should be
taken.

Alarmed by this time, the Queen issued a proclamation

promising to abide by the constitution of 1887, and at the
same time, her sympathizers called a rival mass meeting for
Monday afternoon in order to draw people away from the
revolutionary assemblage.

The two meetings were in session

at the same hour. The citizens at the armory empowered the
committee of public safety to "further consider the situation
and further devise such ways and means as may be necessary to
secure the permanent maintenance of law and order and the pro80

tection of life, liberty and property in Hawaii.w

The

committee soon decided to establish a Provisional Government
for the management of affairs until annexation to the United
States was secured, and appointed Sanford B. Dole, James A.
King, Peter C. Jones, and William 0. Smith to make up the
executive council. Due to the danger of conflict many United

80. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 55d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
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States* citizens asked the American minister to have a force
of marines landed from the Boston, a naval vessel in the
harbor under the command of Captain G. C. Wiltse.

Captain

Wiltse describes the proceedings in the capital in a letter
81
written on January 18, to B. F. Tracy, Secretary of the Navy.
"At 4:30 p. m., January 16, I landed the ship's
battalion under command of Lieut. Commander William
T. Swinburne.
"One detachment of marines was placed at the
legation and one at the consulate, while the main body
of men, with two pieces of artillery, were quartered
in a hall of central location near the Government
building.
"On Tuesday, January 17, a provisional government
was established and the Queen dethroned.
"The Provisional Government took possession of the
Government buildings, the archives, and the treasury,
the Queen acquiescing under protest. The Provisional
Government was recognized as the de facto Government of
the Hawaiian Islands by the United States minister."
During the next few days the Provisional Government was
recognized by all of the powers who had representatives in
Honolulu.

On January 19, the new officials sent a commission

to the United States by special steamer for the purpose of
negotiating a treaty of annexation.

The five members of the

committee were William C. Wilder, L. A. Thurston, W. H.
Castle, H. P. Carter, and Mr. Marsden, who together repre
sented a large proportion of the property holders and commer-

81. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
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cial interests of the Islands.
Paul Neuman, the attorney
of Liliuokalani, left on the same steamer in order to pre
sent her side of the revolution, and in case of annexation
to secure for her as large an annuity as possible.

Also at

this time, the Queen sent a letter to President Harrison
asking him to restore her to the throne and saying that she
had yielded because she did not wish to come into conflict
with the United States* troops which, she claimed, were landed
83
to aid the revolutionists.
In Washington the commissioners were favorably received.
The State Department since the Civil War had been decidedly
jingoistic in attitude due largely to Seward and Blaine.
During his year as Secretary of State under Garfield, Blaine
inaugurated a comprehensive foreign policy which resented
vigorously European interference in North and South American
affairs, particularly in regard to an interoceanic canal, and
attempted to make the United States the arbiter of the dis
putes of the Latin American states, whether among themselves
or with some foreign power.

Mr. Blaine was made Secretary of

State again in the Harrison administration, and again he pur
sued his policy of interference in the domestic affairs in

82. House Ex. Doc. No.48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess.,Vol.XXVII,pp.188-201.
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as published by the Hawaiian Gazette Co., 1893.
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Latin America using the threat of war to coerce them. His
jingoism together with the extreme position taken by Congress
nearly involved the United States in war with Great Britain
over the seal-fisheries, in 1889.

In this same year the

American commissioners went to Bismarck's Berlin Congress
where the Samoan affair was to be considered, and it was their
cable saying that Bismarck flew into a rage whenever German
domination in Samoa was questioned, which occasioned Blaine's
famous reply: "The extent of the Chancellor's irritability is
84
not the measure of American rights."
As a result of the
American stand in the affair, the three powers, Germany,
England, and the United States entered into a treaty which
guaranteed the autonomy of the islands, restored Malietoa to
his throne, and provided for a tripartite protectorate over
Samoa.

This was certainly a departure from the traditional

policy of avoiding "entangling alliances". In fact, the
editor of the Nation describes Blaine as being popular with
the people because of "his somewhat boisterous and often fan
tastic egression of that longing for the spread of American
influence and domination abroad, known as 'Americanism', which
constitutes the conscious patriotism of large bodies of the
less thoughtful voters", and which "more than compensated for

84. McElroy, op. cit.. Vol. I, p. 260.
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all his shortcomings" as a statesman.
This policy was approved by John L. Stevens, who was
appointed as United States minister to Hawaii in 1889.
His reports not only gave detailed accounts of internal
affairs in the Islands but also described their material
resources and possibilities. In a confidential dispatch
written November 20, 1892, two months before the Hawaiian
revolution, he took up the question as to what should be done
with the Islands.

"One of two courses seems to me absolutely

necessary to be followed," he wrote, "either bold and
vigorous measures for annexation or a 'customs union*, an
ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl
Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied
but not necessarily stipulated American protectorate over the
islands. I believe the former to be the better," he continued,
"that which will prove much the more advantageous to the
islands, and the cheapest and least embarrassing in the end
for the United States."

In discussing the sugar bounty, he

advised a stipulation in the treaty that Hawaiian planters
would be paid a bounty of only six mills per pound rather than
the two cents given American growers, and this to last only as

85. The Nation, Vol. LVI, p. 75; Carl Russell Fish, The Path
of Empire, A Chronicle of the United States as a World
Power (New Haven, 1921); Mrs. Alice Felt Tyler, The Foreign
Policy of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis, 1927); Edward
Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine (New York, 1905); Nearing
and Freeman, op. cit., p. 243.

long as the bounty-system was maintained.

This small

bounty would be enough to carry the planters through the
depression occasioned by the McKinley Tariff.

In closing

his report, Minister Stevens made an even more definite ex
pression of his conception of future American relations with
Hawaii saying that although the American government must de
cide which of the two lines of policy and action must be
followed, it was certain "that the interests of the United
States and the welfare of these islands will not permit the
continuance of the existing state and tendency of things.
Having for so many years extended a helping hand to the
islands and encouraged the American residents and their
friends at home to the extent we have, we can not refrain now
from aiding them with vigorous measures, without injury to
ourselves and those of our

f kith

and kin' and without neglect

ing American opportunities that never seemed so obvious and
pressing as they do now."

86

The arrival of the Hawaiian com

missioner seeking annexation was no surprise, therefore, to the
Secretary of State who by this time was John W. Foster, Mr.
Blaine having died about February first. Mr. Foster, another
follower of Blaine*s foreign policy, soon negotiated the treaty
of annexation and rushed it to President Harrison who desired
to settle the question before he went out of office on March

86. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. 2XVTI,
pp. 117-118.
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fourth.

In the absence of telegraphic communication, Secre

tary Foster in making out his report had to place entire
dependence upon Steven* s dispatches and the statements of the
commissioners sent to Washington by the Provisional Govern
ment.

As one would expect, these all emphasized the blameless-

ness of the jjiierican part in the Hawaiian revolution, and this
attitude was reflected in Mr. Foster's recommendations and in
Harrison's message to the Senate. Mr. Foster pointed out in
his communication to the President that the "unconstitutional
and intemperate acts of the Q,ueen" were the immediate cause
of the revolution, that the American marines took no part at
all in effecting the change, that the Provisional Government
took possession of the Government buildings without the help
of the marines, that the Provisional Government was then recog
nized by Stevens as having obtained full de facto control,
that this same government was recognized by representatives of
the other nations, and that instructions had been sent to
Stevens approving his action as far as it coincided with
standing instructions to the legation, and disavowing any
steps in excess of such instructions which might seem "to
have been asserted to the impairment of the independent
sovereignty of the Hawaiian Government by the assumption of a
87
formal protectorate."
President Harrison similarly assigned

87. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
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as the cause of the recent trouble the "reactionary and
revolutionary" policy of Liliuokalani which placed in peril
the foreign investments and the "decent administration of
civil affairs and the peace of the islands."

Very firmly

he asserted that the American government did not promote the
subversion of the monarchy.

There are two courses possible,

to establish a protectorate or to annex the Islands, he be
lieved, and the latter would be preferable from both the
American and the Hawaiian points of view and would keep the
88

other great powers out.

He therefore strongly recommended

prompt action in order to restore peace in the Islands.

The

press and the people of the United States seemed to favor his
action and a rhyme about
...Liliuokalani
Give us your little brown hanniel
89
became popular everywhere.
News of Minister Stevens'
establishment of a protectorate pending the settlement of the
negotiations in Washington merely encouraged annexationist
sentiment among the Jmerican people.

Opposition papers pointed

out that the revolution was a huge business scheme on the
part of the sugar planters, the real cause being the forty
two and two-thirds per cent reduction in the price of sugar.

88. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
pp. 177-179.
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The editor of the Nation brought out the fact that the
sugar details of annexation were under discussion before
there was a revolution.

The five-year contracts of the

Western Sugar Refining Company of San Francisco which were
made with the leading Hawaiian planters included a clause
stating that in case an arrangement should be made whereby
the United States would pay a bounty to the Hawaiian planters,
the latter would give a share to the Refining Company.90 Mr.
Thurston of the Hawaiian Annexation Committee not only veri
fied this report concerning the sugar contracts but also
added that the Trust had said, "If you don't like these terms,
eat your sugar."
In the rush at the close of the Harrison administration,
the annexation bill was not passed.

There had been many

rumors concerning Cleveland*s attitude, the majority believ
ing that he would probably favor the treaty.

At the time of

the elections of 1892 the Hawaiian trouble had not arisen so
the President could find but little in his party's platform
to indicate his course of action.

This platform in discussing

foreign affairs had pointed out that the Democratic party was
the only one that had "ever given the country a foreign
policy consistent and vigorous, compelling respect abroad and
inspiring confidence at home," and went on to "view with

9°. The Nation, Vol. LVI, p. 151.
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alarm the tendency to a policy of irritation and bluster
which is liable at any time to confront us with the
91
alternative of humiliation or war."
President Cleveland
had already shown himself directly opposed to this practice
of "irritation and bluster" for which Secretary of State
James G. Blaine had been largely responsible.

He had a very

definite foreign policy of protecting the weak and helpless
nations at a time when their domination was the aim of every
other great power and he was old-fashioned enough to desire
to avoid "entangling alliances" with foreign nations having
advised against the participation of the United States in the
tripartite protectorate of Samoa. During a conference with
Gresham, Carlisle, and Lamont before the inauguration, the
first steps in the Hawaiian affair were planned, leading on
92
March 9, 1895, to the recall of the treaty from the Senate.
Cleveland did this, because the provisional government did
not appear to have the sanction of either popular revolution
or suffrage, because the uprising and negotiations had been
conducted with such haste, and because Liliuokalani's state
ment that she yielded on account of the support given by the
United States troops to the Provisional Government, did not
agree with President Harrison's pronouncement that the Ameri-

91. Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency (New York,
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can government had not in any way promoted the Hawaiian
93
revolution.
In order to learn the truth of the matter,
the President appointed James H. Blount as his personal
representative to investigate the Hawaiian trouble. Mr.
Blount was given paramount authority in all matters touching
American relations with the Provisional Government.
Most of the people believed that the removal of the
treaty was merely a temporary measure and not a great deal
of notice was taken of it.

However, when Blount directed

Admiral Skerrett to lower the United States flag from the
Hawaiian Government Building, the Republican press began to
rave about the stigma on our national honor while the
Democrats answered that Steven*s action in establishing a
protectorate was disavowed by Mr. Harrison and that President
Cleveland was merely taking our flag off other people's
property. During his stay of several weeks on the Islands,
Commissioner Blount conducted a detailed investigation which
led him to conclude that Minister Stevens had recognized the
Provisional Government when the Queen's government was still
in full control of the palace, the barracks, and the police
station.

Furthermore, "at an early stage of the movement,

if not at the beginning, Mr. Stevens promised the annexation
ists that as soon as they obtained possession of the Govern-

93. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Yol. XXVII.
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ment building and there read a proclamation..., he would
at once recognize them as a de facto government, and sup
port them by landing a force from our war ship then in the
harbor."

Minister Stevens kept his promise, Mr. Blount

found, in fact, "this assurance was the inspiration of the
movement, and without it the annexationists would not have
exposed themselves to the consequences of failure," for
they had practically no military forces.

Thus, the action

of the American minister and of the troops landed from the
Boston were responsible for the establishment of the Pro
visional Government and its continuation was due to the fact
that the Hawaiians believed they would be attacking the
94
United States' Government if they attacked it.
The
annexationists dared not put the question to a vote for if
aliens were excluded from voting, annexation would be defeated
by more than five to one.

Secretary of State Foster was not

to be blamed for the stand he had taken, Mr. Blount felt, be
cause he was deceived by the misleading reports of Minister
Stevens and by the statements of the Hawaiian commissioners.
The latter conclusion, as well as all of the Commissioner's
findings, were confirmed by Charles Nordhoff, a veteran
Washington correspondent sent out by the New York Herald to

94. Taken from summary found in Secretary Gresham*s report,
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make an independent investigation.

Due to a leak in the

State department, Blount's report was prematurely published
late in November.

Some of the editorial comment following

its appearance is quoted by McElroy in his biography of
95
Grover Cleveland.
"No one unprejudiced," states the New York Herald in an
editorial of November 22, "can read Mr. Blount's report with
out the conviction that it goes into the archives of the
State Department at Washington as the darkest chapter in the
diplomatic annals of this country."
The editor of the New York Times believed that it "re
veals a conspiracy...which if not repudiated by this nation,
would sully the honor and blacken the fair name of the United
States."
If the people of the country accept Mr. Blount's report,
declared the Savannah Morning News, they "cannot do otherwise
than sustain the position taken by the President and his
Cabinet.

The only way to create a sentiment against that

position is to show that Mr. Blount's report is not correct."
Friends of Stevens and of the treaty immediately began
working through the press and through Congress to discredit
the Commissioner's facts.

They claimed that in his investiga

tion he talked merely with the supporters of "the lady who

95. McElroy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 57-59.

looks like the inside of a package of Arbuckle's coffee,"
and declined all offers of the friends of the Provisional
Government when they desired to assist him. Taking the
revolution and subsequent events step by step, they showed
the innocence of Stevens and the "gross inaccuracies" of
Blount's report. The Congressmen from Maine who had long
been personal friends of Stevens, testified as to his honor
and pointed out that Secretary Gresham as an inveterate enemy
of Blaine and of ex-president Harrison had ample motive for
attacking Blaine's friend and Harrison's appointee.

A de

tailed reply was issued by Mr. Stevens in answer to Blount's
charges. In this the Minister maintained that his actions
were above criticism and that he had merely carried out the
spirit of the only instructions he had for precedent in such
an emergency. These had been sent to Minister Merrill at the
time of the revolution of 1887 by Secretary Bayard, who wished
all precautions to be taken for "the Just protection of the
interests of American citizens in the Islands.

While we

abstain from interfering with the domestic affairs of Hawaii,
in accordance with the policy and practice of this government,"
Mr. Bayard had written, "yet obstruction to the channels of
legitimate commerce under existing law must not be allowed, and
American citizens must be protected in their persons and
property by the representatives of their country's law and
power and no internal discord must be suffered to impair them."

59.

In addition in his defense Mr. Stevens said that he raised
the American flag over the Hawaiian Government Building be
cause the Provisional Government, being only two weeks old,
had no trained troops for its use.

Furthermore, the temporary

protectorate was sufficient to keep Japan and England from
intervening, should they desire to do so, and was probably
the best method available for preserving Hawaii for the United
96
States.
In spite of annexationist attempts to prove the
contrary, however, the agreement of Nordhoff and other dis
interested spectators with Blount caused the majority to be
lieve that the revolution was practically a put-up job of
Stevens and probably to some degree a commercial speculation.
It required more than two months for President Cleveland
to formulate a definite policy on the basis of Blount's
report.

Secretary Gresham believed that since the Q,ueen

had thrown herself on the mercy of the United States and had
been betrayed, justice demanded that steps should now be
taken to restore her.

Just what steps should be taken was

difficult to decide so the advice of the various members of
the Cabinet was asked.

The opinion of Attorney General

Richard Olney furnished the basis for the plan finally
adopted.

After summarizing the origin of the "Steven*s

government" he suggested:

96. Cong. Rec., 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXYI, Part 1,
pp. 190-195.
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"1. All the resources of diplomacy should be ex
hausted to restore the status quo in Hawaii by peaceful
methods and without force.
"2. If, as a last resort, force is found to be neces
sary...the matter must be submitted to Congress for its
action.
"3. In addition to providing for the security of the
queen's person pending efforts to reinstate the queen's
government...the United States should require of the queen...
authority to negotiate and bring about the restoration of
her government on such reasonable terms and conditions as
the United States may approve and find to be practicable.
"Among such terms and conditions must be, I think, full
pardon and amnesty for all connected with the Stevens govern
ment who might otherwise be liable tc be visited with the
97
pains and penalties attending the crime of treason."
Combining Gresham*s suggestion with Mr. Olney*s opinion,
President Cleveland directed Albert S. Willis, the new
minister to Hawaii, to secure frcrn the Q,ueen a grant of full
amnesty to the revolutionists and then to advise the Pro
visional Government of the decision and ask them to relinquish
the authority to Liliuokalani.

If this could not be done by

peaceful means Mr. Willis was to report the facts back to

97. McElroy, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 59, 60.
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Washington for the President had no intention of using
force to restore her since that would require the author98
ity of Congress.
What would happen in the event of a
refusal from either party, no one had considered.
Part of the official action had "become public and many
speculations were being made as to the matter when President
Cleveland sent his First Annual Message to Congress on
December 4, 1893.

It was very disappointing, revealing far

too little of the official action to be satisfactory to the
senators and representatives.

Beyond all question, it

stated, "the constitutional Government of Hawaii had been
subverted with the active aid of our representative to that
Government and through the intimidation caused by the
presence of an armed naval force of the United States, which
was landed for that purpose at the instance of our minister."
Due to our guilt, the President felt that the "only honor
able course for our Government to pursue was to undo the
wrong that had been done by those representing us and to
restore as far as practicable the status existing at the time
of our forcible intervention."

He explained that he had sent

a new minister to Hawaii in order to carry out this plan,
promising, as soon as he had notice of definite results, to
send the information together with Blount's report to Congress

98. House Ex. Doc. No. 48, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII,
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for consideration.
Meanwhile, Minister Willis had not yet had much success
in securing "definite results" in Hawaii.

When he had asked

Liliuokalani, in his first interview, if she would, upon
restoration "by the United States, grant full amnesty to the
revolutionists, she had refused.

Instead of granting

amnesty she would follow the laws of Hawaii which direct
that such people be beheaded and their property confiscated.100
This was rather discouraging to the minister who began to
wonder how the government could be sustained if it were
restored.

"It would fall to pieces like a card house," he

wrote to the President.101 Mr. Cleveland began to see where
Secretary Gresham's policy was leading him and determining
to turn the whole affair over to Congress, he asked Carlisle
and Olney to prepare a special message for him.102 This
document was sent to Congress on December 18, 1893. Appeal
ing to the traditional standards of the American republic,
the President opened with a challenge:
"I suppose that right and justice should determine
the path to be followed in treating this subject. If
national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for
territorial extension, or dissatisfaction with a form

99. James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and
Paperscf the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1901),
Yol. IX, p. 441, 442.
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of government not our own, ought to regulate our con
duct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and
character of our Government and the behavior which
the conscience of our people demands of their public
servants."
After stating his reasons for withdrawing the treaty
from the Senate, Mr. Cleveland proceeded to convict Minister
Stevens, showing that he "zealously promoted" annexation
because he desired that it should be during his ministry, and
that he was not "inconveniently scrupulous as to the means
employed to that end."

His reports after March 8, 1892,

denoted an increasing annexationist feeling and prepared the
reader for his statement of February 1, 1893: "The Hawaiian
pear is now fully ripe and this is the golden hour for the
United States to pluck it."

The Committee of Safety whose

aim was annexation, were in communication with him and on
January 16,

being "unwilling to take further steps

without the cooperation of the United States Minister,"
they sent him a note representing that the public safety was
menaced and concluding: "We are unable to protect ourselves
without aid, and therefore pray for the protection of the
United States forces."

Becoming frightened by their action,

the Committee withdrew their request, but it was too late as
the note had been forwarded to the Boston.

That evening

the detachment of marines was landed, this demonstration
being virtually an act of war as there was no evidence that
they were actually needed for the protection of .American

property.

On the following day, by rather devious

methods, the Provisional Government was proclaimed and was
recognized by Mr. Stevens "pursuant to prior agreement,"
although it was actually neither a government de facto or
de .jure.

A note found in the legation files at Honolulu

addressed by the head of the Provisional Government to
Stevens expressed appreciation of the minister's recognition,
stating that the Provisional Government was "not yet in the
possession of the station house (the place where a large
number of the Queen's troops were quartered), though the
same had been demanded of the Queen's officers in charge."
Since the United States was now allied with the Pro
visional Government, Mr. Cleveland's message continued, the
Queen knew she could not withstand the power of our country,
and believing that she could safely trust to our justice, she
surrendered to her enemies.

With her protest in their hands,

they turned to the United States to sell her kingdom and
very nearly succeeded.

"The control of both sides of a

bargain acquired in such a manner," Mr. Cleveland said of
the Harrison treaty, "is called by a familiar and unpleasant
name when found in private transactions," an accusation
<

which we scrupulously avoided in former days.

But our duty

did not end with having refused to "consummate this ques
tionable transaction" for our country must attempt to make
all possible reparation to the wronged queen.

On the other
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hand, since the members of the Provisional Government
were "led to their present predicament of revolt...by the
indefensible encouragement and assistance of our
diplomatic representative," their safety should be con
sidered too.

The State Department in following this policy

had tried to persuade the queen to promise amnesty to the
revolutionists as the main condition of her restoration, but
had met with failure. Since she had refused to accept the
condition, the plan had gone no farther and "public misrep
resentations of the situation and exaggerated statements"
of public sentiment had made successful executive mediation
nearly impossible.

Since the matter had gone beyond the

bounds of the presidential authority Mr. Cleveland was trans
ferring the entire problem to Congress, promising his cooper103
ation whenever necessary.
The discussion at the time of the publication of Blount's
report was as nothing compared to the criticism which broke
forth as a result of this message. The country was instantly
divided into two parties upon the question, the Republicans
and part of the Democrats denouncing his course, while part
of the Democrats applauded the high moral stand he had taken.
The Senate decided that since they had heard the annexation
ist arguments approving the actions of Stevens and the Pro-

103. House Ex. Doc. No. 47, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. XXVII.
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visional Government, and Mr. Cleveland's message opposing
them, they would authorize the Committee on Foreign Re
lations to inquire into the matter and decide which was
really right.

The Senate, as a matter of fact, had felt

for many months that the President was exceeding his con
stitutional authority and they wished to discourage such
tendencies.

As far as the Hawaiian question was concerned,

however, they might as well have saved their time for it
was already being taken out of their hands by other forces.
On the day upon which the special message was sent to
Congress, Liliuokalani had finally consented to grant amnesty
to those who had been instrumental in overthrowing her, and
on the same day President Dole had asked Mr. Willis if his
actions were hostile to the Provisional Government. The
minister answered by demanding the surrender of the consti
tutional authority to the Q,ueen.

President Dole refused,

claiming that the United States had no right to interfere
with a de facto government, denying the charges made by
Blount, and refusing to restore the government to
Liliuokalani.

Mr. Willis recognized the truth of his claim

but decided to try a ruse before giving up his efforts.
Making use of the fact that the revenue cutter Corwin had
just arrived with dispatches whose contents were unknown to
Dole, the Minister had troops drawn up on the decks of the
Adams and the Philadelphia, as though they were to be landed

to make an attack.

This attempt to "bluff out" the Pro

visional Government failed to convince Dole and it now be
came clear that the matter was settled since President
Cleveland had no right to use force and evidently public
sentiment did not back his policy to that extent.
News of Minister Willis's attempt to use force, an
action certainly contravening the spirit of his instruc
tions, resulted in demands for the impeachment of Cleveland.
During the long debate which took place before his Hawaiian
message, the idea of manifest destiny had become popular
and each believer in this doctrine now felt himself per
sonally thwarted by the attempt to restore the Queen.

In

February the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs was
submitted to Congress by Senator Morgan of Alabama, a member
of the President's party.

The conclusions of the report, all

of which were accepted only by Mr. Morgan, absolved President
Cleveland from any irregularity of conduct and defended
Minister Stevens from most of the charges against him.

"In

his dealings with the Hawaiian Government, his conduct was
characterized by becoming dignity and reserve," the report
read, and "the only substantial irregularity that existed in
the conduct of any officer of the United States or agent of
the President, during or since the time of the revolution
of 1893," was Mr. Stevens* action in establishing a protec
torate.

The four other Democrats on the committee, Senators
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M. C. Butler, David Turpie, John W. Daniel, and George
Gray, agreed in the belief that the President committed
no irregularities in the appointment of Mr. Blount or the
instructions given him, but they disagreed regarding the
exoneration of Minister Stevens.

They believed his con

duct to be "seriously reprehensible and deserving of public
censure" because it "was directly conducive to bringing
about the condition of affairs which resulted in the over
throw of the Q,ueen, the organization of the Provisional
Government, the landing of the United States troops, and
the attempted scheme of annexation."

Both Mr. Butler arid

Mr. Turpie favored annexation but did not wish to take ad
vantage of internal dissension in the Islands as a pretext.
The four Republican members of the committee, Senators
John Sherman, William P. Frye, J. N. Dolph, andCushman
K. Davis, differed from Mr. Morgan's first conclusion and
issued a statement of their own.

They believed (1) that

Blount's appointment was unconstitutional, (2) that placing
the Honolulu naval forces under Blount and Willis was un
lawful, (3) that Mr. Blount's order to lower the flag was
unlawful and his intercourse with the Q,ueen both unconsti
tutional and contrary to international law, (4) that
Cleveland had no authority to reopen the Hawaiian question
after Harrison had settled it by recognizing the Provisional
Government, and (5) that the actions of Blount and Willis
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were all recognized as attempts to carry out the Presi104
dent's expressed policy.
After the publication of this report, the "Hawaiian
Question" took on a partisan aspect.

Congress had three

alternatives before her, namely, to recognize the Provisional
105
Government, to restore the Q,ueen, or to take a plebiscite.
The supporters of Mr. Cleveland ignored the findings of the
Senate Committee and argued that annexation should not take
place until a plebiscite had been taken in the Islands.
Additional reasons for delay advanced by them were the dis
tance of Hawaii from our coast, its uselessness as a naval
strategic point, the impossibility of admitting its
heterogeneous population to citizenship, and the national
istic feeling of the natives. Those favoring annexation
urged the great preponderance of American capital and in
fluence in the Islands, their value from a military and
naval point of view, and their commercial opportunities,as
reasons for their immediate acquisition.

As the discussion

went on, it became evident that the House was unwilling to
take steps to restore the Q,ueen by force while the Senate

104. Sen. Rep. No. 227, 53d Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. LL.
The Nation, Yol. LYII, p. 443.
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believed that the United States should keep out of
Hawaiian affairs for the present and should insist that
other nations do likewise.

This was tantamount to

recognizing the Provisional Government and postponing
annexation until a more convenient time.

With this en

couragement the Dole government proclaimed the Hawaiian
Republic on July 4, 1894, and as its stability was evident,
President Cleveland withdrew the American war vessels and
gave it formal recognition. Having thus recognized that
Dole * s government was "able to speak with the voice of
Hawaiian sovereignty," McElroy, Mr. Cleveland's biographer,
believes that the President was illogical when he sub1
sequently refused its request for annexation.
The
royalists, as a result, believed that he still favored
their cause and tried unsuccessfully to enlist his aid
in their last attempt against the Dole government, the
revolt of 1895, which met defeat.

106. McElroy, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 69-70.
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Affairs in Hawaii were much relieved "by the passage
of the Wilson-Gorman tariff.

By December 4, 1893, the

Wilson bill, representing Mr. Cleveland's tariff ideas, was
ready to present to Congress. Placing lumber, coal, iron,
wool, raw sugar and refined sugar on the free list and cut
ting down the duty on manufactured woolens, linens, and cot
tons, it brought a storm of opposition.

To this the various

sugar interests contributed for it struck a blow at both the
sugar trust which was subsidized by the HcKinley bill and
the sugar growers who had been the recipients of a bounty
since 1900.

The Wilson tariff passed the House but met with

so many amendments in the Senate that its entire nature was
changed. Here the sugar trust was so successful in securing
protection that the Senate appointed a committee to investi
gate their methods. H. 0. Havemeyer, president of the Sugar
Trust, admitted on the stand that the Trust regularly con
tributed to campaign funds - to the Republican fund in a
Republican state and to the Democratic fund in a Democratic
state.

These contributions were concealed on their books

as "expenses". He also admitted that the Trust kept lobby
ists in Washington while the Wilson bill was before Congress
in order to influence the Congressmen to favor the sugar in107
terests.
Both Senators McFherson and Quay admitted

107. Sen. Rep. No. 606, 53rd Cong. 2d Sess.
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having purchased sugar stocks while the debate was in
progress, Senator Quay expressing his intention to continue.
Nothing was done in regard to Havemeyer and the senators
escaped with a censure.

After a two-months' tariff war the

compromise Wilson-Gorman bill was passed, providing, among
other changes, for a forty-per cent ad valorem duty on raw
sugar and one-eighth of a cent a pound on refined.
The reciprocity treaty between the United States and
Hawaii was still in force, being subject after 1894 to ter
mination at a twelve months' notice.

As a result, the res

toration of duties on sugar placed Hawaii on the old profit
able basis, at the same aiding them indirectly by ruining
the Cuban sugar business and precipitating a revolution
I AO

there.

An idea of the effect on sugar crops may be

gained from the following figures which were made public by
109
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.
The increase
in the output, most noticeable in 1895-S6, continued until
1908 when it reached one billion pounds.
1890-91
1891-92
1892-93
1893-94
1894-95
1895-96
1896-97

146,174 tons
122,279 n
152,621 »
166,432 »
149,627 "
225,828 "
248,555 M

108. Cuba had no reciprocity treaty with the United States.
She had developed sugar planting under the encourage
ment of the McKinley bill.
109. Consular Report, Vol. LVT, No. 209, p. 238.
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As prosperity returned to the sugar industry, it returned
to all Hawaii.

Total imports rose from #5,339,785 in 1895

to $6,063,652 in 1896.

Of this amount, $4,516,319 worth

were from the United States in 1895 and #5,464,208 worth in
1896.

In 1896 American ships carried exports valued at

#13,502,410 and imports valued at $7,164,561.

Of the entire

export and import trade in 1896, the United States had 82.53
per cent; Great Britain 7.93; Germany 2.98; and Hawaii 5.26P"
The revival of Hawaiian trade and industry had the effect of
lessening the pressure of the annexationists for the time
being. Having had one demonstration of the entire dependence
of Hawaiian progress on the desires and whims of American
politicians, they were not likely to drop all agitation, how
ever.

Annexation was the step which would place them perman

ently within the hounds of American protection and assure
them of unremitted prosperity.
During the debate on the Hawaiian question British pub
lic sentiment had urged this country to take over the Islands
and become an imperialistic nation.

Now, in the latter part

of 1894 and in 1895 the British minister took a step which
eventually provided the annexationists with one of their
most telling arguments.

This was the request for the cession

110- Commercial Relations of the United States, 1895 and
1896, Vol. I, pp. 1008-1013.
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of Neckar Island, French. Frigate Shoal, or Bird Island for
the purpose of establishing a station for a submarine tele
graphic cable there.

On account of the distance between Van

couver and the Australian coast, the proposed terminii of
the cable, it was desirable to have a station in mid-ocean
between these points.

A spur was to be extended to Hawaii.

Since the Hawaiian government had agreed by the reciprocity
treaty not to allow any nation to land a telegraphic cable
upon its shores without the previous consent of the United
States, they submitted the matter to the United States with
out even expressing an opinion.

On January 9, 1895, Presi

dent Cleveland submitted the British request to Congress
recommending that it be granted, "especially in view of the
fact that our own communication with that country would there
by be greatly improved without apparent detriment to any
legitimate American interest.Congress did not agree
with the President.

It believed that Great Britain wished

to establish this cable mainly for military purposes and
that it would lead to British superiority over the United
States in case of a war involving the Islands.

As a result

the request was not granted. Undaunted, the British now tried
another method.

A few months later, two men came to Honolulu

where they excited suspicion by their persistent inquiries

111. Richardson, op. cit., Vol. IX, pp. 559-60.
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concerning the exact status of Neckar Island.

As this

island had never been formally claimed, the Hawaiian govern
ment began to suspect a plan to seize it for Great Britain.
A party was therefore sent out to take formal possession and
the efforts of Great Britain ceased.

The indignant American

Senate, strongly resenting this attempt, passed a resolution
to the effect that any interference of a foreign nation with
the Hawaiian Islands would be regarded as an act of unfriend
liness toward the United States.

This showed a growing con

sciousness of the fact that Hawaii was a part of the so-called
"American system,* and gave a decided impetus to sentiment
favoring acquisition.
In 1896 this sentiment was embodied in a plank of the
Republican platform stating that "the Hawaiian Islands should
be controlled by the United States, and no foreign power
112
should be permitted to interfere with them."
One of the
men helping to draw up this declaration was Joseph B. Foraker
who made the nominating speech for McXinley at the St. Louis
convention.

In speaking of the stand taken on the Hawaiian

question, Foraker said that it was in "exact accord" with
some remarks that he made at a banquet given on February 22,
1896, in honor of his election as senator.

112. Stanwood, op. cit., p. 535.
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had said:"*""^
"The time has come ishen there is an emphatic
demand for a wise, broad, patriotic, progressive
aggressive American statesmanship. I do not like
the idea of our being unable to step out at either
our front door or back door, on the Atlantic or
the Pacifie side, without seeing England's flag
floating from all the islands that meet our view,
with her guns pointing wheresoever she will. When
the Sandwich Islands come knocking at the door
with a republican form of government and the Amer
ican flag, I say, let them in."
These were the ideas of the great majority of Republi
cans, Mr. Foraker said, and Mr. McKinley had known these to
be his sentiments when asking him to attend the convention
and assist in making the platform.

No such beliefs were in

the minds of the Democrats who were looking around for
another issue to revive their rapidly waning prestige.
did not even mention Hawaii.

They

The public reaction against

all of Cleveland's policies was so great that the Republicans
claimed without much contradiction that they "could nominate
a rag baby and elect it President" that year.114
Almost immediately, upon the return of the Republicans
to power, a new treaty was drawn up. It was submitted to
the Senate on June 16, 1897, accompanied by a message from
115
President McKinley.
After mentioning various events in

113. Joseph Benson Foraker, Motes of a Busy Life (Cincinnati,
1917), Vol. I, pp. 483-5.
114. Stanwood, op. cit., p. 525.
115. Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., Vol. III.
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American relations with Hawaii, he summarized the policy of
the United States toward them as one which has consistently
favored their autonomous welfare, with the exclusion of all
foreign influence save our own, to the extent of upholding
eventual annexation as the necessary outcome of that policy."
The failure of annexation in 1893 "may not be a cause for
congratulation," Mr. McKinley continued, but it "is certain
ly a proof of the disinterestedness of the United States,
the delay of four years having abundantly sufficed to estab
lish the right and the ability of the Republic of Hawaii to
enter, as a sovereign contractant, upon a conventional union
with the United States, thus realizing a purpose held by the
Hawaiian people and proclaimed by successive Hawaiian govern
ments through some twenty years of their virtual dependence
upon the benevolent protection of the United States.

Under

such circumstances," the President concluded, "annexation is
116
not a change. It is a consummation."
The annexation treaty of 1897 was also accompanied by
a report from Secretary Sherman stating that Hawaii was
sending to the United States "not a commission representing
a successful revolution, but the accredited plenipotentiary
117

of a constituted and fimly established sovereign state."

116. Sen. Rep. No. 681, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., Appendix 2,
pp. 65-67.
117. Ibid., 74.
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This change nominally placed Hawaii in a position much
stronger than that of 1893. Since no criticism could be
made of the Republic as the representative of Hawaiian sov
ereignty, manifest destiny was clearly the issue.

President

McKinley now invited delay, urging "due deliberation" upon
the Senate, in great contrast to President Harrison's message
of 1893 asking for prompt action.

In fact, Senator Davis,

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, admitted that
the sending in of the Hawaiian treaty at this time was only
a political move and that no attempt would be made to ratify
it at the present session.

The editor of the Nation accused

the Administration of "playing fast and loose with the
lift
Hawaiians in order to crowd through its tariff."
Delay in dealing with the Hawaiian question had always
seemed to redound to the credit of the annexationists, and
the passage of time seemed to demonstrate as to the truth of
their thesis.

Soon after the treaty was sent to the Senate,

imperialists were furnished another argument when the
Japanese government instructed their minister to formally
HQ
protest against the annexation for the following reasons:
"First - The maintenance of the status quo of
Hawaii is essential to the good understanding of
the Powers that have interests in the Pacific.
"Second - The annexation of Hawaii would tend
118.

The Nation, Vol. IXEV, p. 463.
119. Ibid., Yol. IXV, p. 24.
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to endanger the residential, commercial, and in
dustrial rights of Japanese subjects in Hawaii,
secured to them by treaty and by the Constitution
and laws of that country.
"Third - Such annexation might lead to the
postponement by Hawaii of the settlement of claims
and liabilities already existing in favor of Japan
under treaty stipulations.M
Although Japan had made no protest in 1893 when annexation
was contemplated she had since then defeated China and had
suddenly become the leading nation of Asia. The Japanese
poured into the Islands so rapidly after 1893 that the
Hawaiian government feared an attempt on the part of Japan
at control through colonization.

Convinced that many

Japanese were entering in violation of the immigration laws,
one thousand were refused admission in 1897.

Their govern

ment protested and demanded indemnity, thus leading to a
complicated discussion which was in progress when the protest
to the United States was made. In response to Secretary Sher
man's suspicions that Japan wanted Hawaii for herself, Minis
ter Hoshi issued a statement saying that she had "absolutely
120
no designs of any kind whatever inimical to Hawaii."
She
was intervening only for the purpose of safeguarding the
rights of twenty-five thousand of her subjects resident in
the Islands.

Mr. McKinley found it hard to fully credit this

statement and so did thousands of annexationists who now

120. The Nation, Vol. IXV, pp. 79, 80.
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argued that Hawaii would soon be a Japanese colony if the
United States did not take her.121

Eventually Japan with-

drew her protest and the matter was dropped.122
On September 16 the treaty of annexation was signed by
the Hawaiian Senate and its friends believed that when
Congress met in December it could be rushed through without
much trouble, probably before the holiday recess. President
McKinley in his December message touched upon the question
very lightly saying he tkought that "every consideration of
dignity and honor" required that the treaty be ratified.123
"Fifty Opinions of the Presidents Message" were printed by
Public Opinion on December 16. Republican, Democratic, and
Independent comment of the fifty newspapers were given
separately. All of the Republican organs except the Omaha
Bee were silent on the subject of Hawaii. The Bee criticized
the President's failure to present some practical reasons for
annexation and believed that he took a "singular view...of a
scheme concocted and promoted by a few political adventurers.

121. George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Tears, (New
Yorfc, 1906), Vol. II, pp. 305-509. Some even advocated
the establishment of a protectorate saying that Hawaii
would not be able to maintain herself against Japan
while waiting for the treaty.
122. Hawaii paid her an indemnity of $75,000 in order to
settle the immigration trouble. "Japan's Hawaiian In
demnity" from Honolulu Hawaiian Gazette, reprinted in
Public Opinion, Vol. 2XV, No. 8, pp. 236-7»
123. Senate Journal, 55th Cong. 2d Sess., pp. 4-11*
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...No less remarkable," the Bee continued, "is the state
ment of the president that the Hawaiians 'have come of their
free will to merge their destinies in our body politic', the
fact being that the native Hawaiians have had no opportunity
to express their will except through public meetings and
these have shown that they are almost unanimously opposed to
annexation."

124

The "Hawaiian grab" was mentioned by seven of the other
12*5

newspapers quoted, three Democratic and four Independent. ^
These were the Louisville Courier Journals the Pittsburg
Post, the St. Paul Globe, the Boston Herald, the Indianapo
lis Hews, the Pittsburg Chronicle-Telegraph, and the Detroit
Free Press, and all expressed themselves adversely upon the
part of the Presidents message dealing with Hawaii which
the Chronicle Telegraph characterized as "mere twaddle"#126
In the three months debate which followed, "manifest
destiny" in Hawaii was considered from every angle and oppo
sition to the policy gradually increased.

On February 24,

1898, the Nation in describing the progress of the discus
sion, said that while the scheme was sure to be opposed from

124. Omaha (Nebr.) Bee, "Fifty Opinions of the President's
Message", in Public Opinion, Vol. XXIII, No. 25, p. 773.
125. Pittsburg (Pa.) Post calls-annexation the "Hawaiian
grab".
126. "Fifty Opinions of the President's Message", in Public
Opinion, Vol. XXIII, No. 25, pp. 773-776.
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the first by nearly all of the Democratic Senators, it was
now fought openly by such Republicans as Senator Morrill of
Vermont and Senator Gear of Iowa.

All through the north the

Republican press was turning against annexation. As public
sentiment declared against "manifest destiny", the senators
who had been without strong convictions in the beginning
had tended to turn against it too.

As a result, one opposi

tion senator estimated that at that time there would be more
127
than forty votes against the treaty.
By March the Adminis
tration had ceased to push annexation with much force and
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations had recognized
the impossibility of securing a two-thirds vote. They
abandoned the treaty about the middle of March. Senator
Hanna's support of the Presidents imperialistic policy
seemed to have availed nothing and the accord of the Four,
Senators Aldrich, Allison, 0. H. Piatt, and Spooner, was
set at naught. But "manifest destiny" was not defeated, it
was merely gathering forces for a final attack. Less than
a month later, Beveridge, then a candidate for the Senate
was re-stating the doctrine of all imperialists in his
"March of the Nations" speech. Asked to make a talk on
Ulysses S. Grant, he "threw a bomfcshell among the tables

127. The Nation, Vol. LOTI, p. 139.
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when lie "began in the strain"
"He (Grant) never forgot that we are a conquering
race and that we must obey our blood and occupy new
markets, and, if necessary, new lands...*
"American factories are making more than the
American people can use; American soil is producing
more than they can consume. Fate has written our
policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall
be ours. And we will get it as our mother (England)
has told us how. We will establish trading-posts
throughout the world as distributing points for Ameri
can products. We will cover the ocean with our mer
chant marine. We will build a navy to the measure of
our greatness. Great colonies governing themselves
flying our flag and trading with us, will grow about
our posts of trade. Our institutions will follow our
flag on the wings of our commerce. And American law,
American order, American civilization, and the Ameri
can flag will plant themselves on shores hitherto
bloody and benighted, but by those agencies of God
henceforth to be made beautiful and bright...•
"If this means the Stars and Stripes over an
Isthmian canal...over Hawaii...over Cuba and the
southern seas...then let us meet that meaning with
a mighty joy and make that meaning good, no matter
what barbarism and all our foes may do or say.*
Events again began shaping themselves in a manner to
demonstrate the arguments of the annexationists.

On April

19, a joint resolution of Congress empowered the President
to intervene forcibly in Cuba and establish peace there.
The Navy Department, foreseeing that in case of a war with
Spain it would be desirable to attack her dependencies, had
already sent Admiral Itewey to Hongkong where he was ready
to leave for the Philippines at a momentfs notice. His

128. Claude G. Bowers, Beveridge and, the Progressive Era
(Cambridge, Mass., 1932) p. 68,69.

84.

1 PQ

order Game from Secretary Long on April 25:xc'5
"War lias commenced between the United States and
Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands.
Commence operations particularly against the Spanish
fleet. Tou must capture vessels or destroy. Use
utmost endeavor."
Obeying orders, Admiral Dewey, on May 1, took Manila
bay.

Owing to laek of a sufficient landing force he did not

occupy Manila itself until August 13. Mow the value of Hono
lulu as a port of call for coal and fresh provisions was
shown.

When reenforcements were sent to Dewey, the Hawaiian

government, which under international law should have at
once declared her neutrality, declined to take this step
and permitted troops to land for supplies. The Spanish con
sul at Honolulu immediately protested at her grant of the
use of her harbors to a belligerent nation.

The Hawaiian

government declared that the United States was her best
friend and she would welcome the American troops in her
harbors and on her shore.

This was in reality a declara

tion of alliance with the United States though no formal
alliance existed.

This action, together with the fore

shadowed policy in the Philippines made certain that an
nexation would come soon.
In the meantime, the Republicans, finding it impossible

129. Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Time
as Shown in his own Letters (New York, 1920], Vol, I,
p. 96.

to secure a two-thirds majority in the Senate, had decided
to use the method of joint annexation which required only
a majority in each house. When introduced in this way,
however, a bill gained no special consideration and had to
take its chance along with the rest of the business of Con
gress.

It particularly required cooperation from the

speaker for it was perfectly possible for him to refuse
opportunity to bring such a resolution before the House.
Mow it happened that Thomas B. Seed, Speaker of the House,
was one of the few Republicans from New England who had
not departed from the standards of his forefathers to em
brace imperialism. His position as Speaker had prevented
his taking part in the former debates on the Hawaiian ques
tion but his stand on the matter was well known. This
country should "grow up to the territory we have already"
and try to create a fully united nation, he had written in
an article on naval affairs.

In spite of the protests

of members of his own party, he opposed the introduction
of the annexation bill all through April. After the cap
ture of Manila bay, annexationist sentiment again became
so strong that Speaker Reed had to give in. The Newlands
resolution was brought before the House on May 4. Even then,

130. "The New Navy", Illustrated American, Sept. 25, 1897,
quoted in William A. Hobinson, Thomas B. Reed, Parlia
mentarian (New York, 1930), p. 357.
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lie refused for three weeks to permit a rule for its con
sideration.

On May 24, the Republican members circulated

a petition requesting: Chairman Grosvenor to summon a
caucus "to consider the Hawaiian resolution with a view
to its prompt and speedy consideration and to transact
such other business as may be necessary."

Seeing that

the question would have to be fought out sooner or later,
Speaker Reed capitulated and on June 2 it was announced
that the Hawaiian measure would be passed before the ad
journment of the House.

A few days later unaminous con

sent was given to Mr. Hitt*s resolution to set aside the
order of business on June 11 and proceed with the Hawaiian
debate until June 15 when a vote should be taken.

Thus

began the first great Congressional debate over "manifest
destiny" in its modern sense of economic imperialism.
Chairman Hitt of the House Committee on Foreign Rela
tions fired the opening gun. Always a successful pleader,
he seldom attended the House sessions; except when a ques
tion concerning our foreign relations was up for considera
tion.^2 How he launched into a powerful support of the
Administration measure. For many years, he pointed out,

131. Washington Post, May 24, 25, 26; New York Tribune, June
2, 1898, quoted in Robinson, op. cit., p. 366, 367.
132. Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service, Per
sonal Recollections of Shelby M. Cullom (Chicago, 19111.
p. 9.
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Hawaii had contemplated union with. America, two voluntary
attempts having been made in 1851•

This being true, the

question for discussion was whether the Islands were of any
value to the United States or not.

Believing the affirmative,

Mr. Hitt set out to prove his ease by referring to the
opinions of such naval experts as Admiral Walker, Captain
Mahan, General Schofield, Admiral Belknap, General Alexander,
Admiral Dupont and Chief Engineer Melville. All of these,
Mr. Hitt said, have testified as to Hawaii's strategic im
portance in the defense of our Western coast. They believe
furthermore, that the American possession of Hawaii would
diminish the necessity for a naval force in the Pacific
while in the hands of an enemy it would furnish a secure
base for active operations against our coast. Although
we have Pearl Harbor, Mr. Hitt continued, no less an autho
rity than General Schofield, after a three months survey
decided that we needed the Islands too, to prevent all
neutral complications.

Moreover since the Pearl Harbor

grant was made in return for reciprocity it would cease
with the cessation of reciprocity, an event likely to occur
in case of their annexation by another power.

That other

powers realized their value was evidenced by the represen
tatives which seventeen nations kept continuously at
Honolulu as well as by the Japanese protests to the
United States. The campaign in the Philippines had made

some action imperative for if we recognized Hawaii's neu
trality we would lay her liable to damages to Spanish ship
ping by our use of her ports.

Since annexation was really

not a departure from the established customs of our country
due to the necessity of our possessing Hawaii for "the de
fense of our Western shore,

the protection and promotion

of our commercial interests, and the welfare and security
of our country generally,** the few objections made in re
gard to race, leprosy, etc. were negligible, Mi*. Hitt con
cluded.
He was answered by three powerful anti-annexationists,
the first being Mr. Hugh Dinsmore of Arkansas, who said he
hoped the debate would not become a partisan affair. Al
though previously favoring annexation, Mr. Dinsmore con
fessed that his study of the question had made him its
opponent.

In the first place, he contended, we have no

constitutional authority to take Hawaii except as a terri
tory to be admitted as a state, an utterly impossible pro
cedure. In the second place, there is no necessity for our
espousal of a colonial policy—a step which would involve
us in practically every European controversy that occurred
over territory.

In the third place its loss would not be

a calamity as we could use our coaling station at Unalaska,

133. Cong. Rec. Vol. XXXI, Part 6, 55th Cong. 2d Sess.,
p. 5770-5776.

while its acquisition would undoubtedly require a navy in
1 ^4.
the Pacific and fortifications on our Western coast.
Champ Clark next took up

the attack on the imperialists

and struck some strong blows in his party's behalf. Ho
real gain will come from such a step, he said, for it is
not like our past acquisitions of territory—it is not
open to development.

The reason this proposition is being

pushed so hard is because $5,000,000 of Hawaiian bonds
have been sold in this country at about thirty cents on
the dollar and annexation will guarantee their payment.
Furthermore, if admitted as a state, Hawaii will have
two senators and a representative whose votes the Republi
cans need, also three electoral ballots which McKinley
will need in 1900. If Hawaii is annexed, our colonial
policy will have commenced. A bill has already been
introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge to purchase the
islands of St. Hiomas, St. Croix, and St. John, and many
here are talking of annexing Puerto Rico, the Philippines,
the Canaries, and the Caroline islandsr135
"This annexation scheme is in flagrant viola
tion of that basic principle of our Republic, for
many thousand Hawaiians...have solemnly protested
against the sale and delivery of their country to
us by a little gand of adventurers who, claiming
to be the whole thing, are offering us a property
of which they have robbed the rightful owners."
134. Cong. Rec. Vol. XXXI, Part 6, 55th Cong. 2d sess.,
p. 5776-5782.
135. Ibid., p. 5788-5795.
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The propaganda these adventurers have openly carried
on in Washington has been a disgrace and no other govern
ment on earth would permit the agents of a foreign country
to come to its capital and interfere openly in its affairs.
In conclusion, Mr. Clark took a shot at manifest destiny,
the darling of the annexationists, defining it in the words
of Rob Roy:-*-3®
"The good old rule, the simple plan
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
The third of the trio for the negative was Henry U.
Johnson of Indiana. He maintained three propositions, first
that the acquisition of Hawaii is not necessary as a war
measure in our conflict with Spain, second, that it is not
necessary to prevent its falling into the hands cff another
great power, and third, that Hawaiian annexation is inherent
ly wrong and an opening wedge to lead to further additions
of territory. Since Hawaii is not fit to be admitted as a
state it would have to be governed as a conquered province,,
a proceeding for which there is no American authority.

The

other colonies which we would seeure, once launched on this
scheme, would all have to be governed in contravention of
republican principles with the result that in time of war
they would become the liability to us that Spain's has been

136. Cong. Ree., Vol. XXXI, Part 6, p. 5788-5795.

to her. The whole affair would "be mere presumption on our
part, Mr. Johnson felt, for any country which supports a
document like the Monroe Doctrine, has no right to meddle
in Asiatic affairs#

T 'Vt

On June 14, William Sulzer of New York made a speech
in support of the bill. Up to the present, he told the
House, the Democrats have always been the annexationists,
for every increase of national territory except Alaska has
come under a Democratic administration. Grover Cleveland
alone opposed this policy in his attempt to restore Liliuokalani, a proceeding not favored by American sentiment.
The contemplated acquisition would neither be a departure
from our past policy nor from the Monroe Doctrine as Hawaii
is a contiguous territory which is necessary to our pre
servation. In obtaining the Islands we would merely
emulate the example of European powers who realize that the
destiny of a nation depends upon its control of markets and
will step into the Pacific themselves unless we watch our
rights and protect our interests there.

Our first step in

preservation must be, then, the annexation of Hawaii, the
key to the whole situation.13®

William Hepburn, Mr. Sul

zer^ colleague, agreed in accusing the Democrats of

137. Cong. Rec., Vol. XXXI, Part 7, p. 5992-6002.
138. Ibid., Part 6, p. 5905-5907.

changing sides on the annexation question and read the
Ostend Manifesto as an example of their former attitude#
Denying that the possession of Hawaii necessarily com
mitted us to a eolonial policy, he saw no harm in im
perialism if it did result.

Three legitimate ways of ac

quiring territory are recognized—by purchase, by conquest,
and by discovery, he pointed out.

Unless we wish defeat

for our forces, we all hope that Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
the Philippines will be ours by conquest. No one knows
exactly what we will do with this territory but we will
probably retain parts as coaling stations for commerce
has greatly changed and to-day we must have these friendly
ports or "drop out of the procession of nations in their
great effort to capture the commerce of the world".
The discussion was brought to a close by the taking of
the vote.

The joint resolution of the majority was passed

by two hundred and nine to ninety one.

It was then re

ferred in the Senate to the Committee on Foreign Relations
which reported it without amendment on June 17. On June
20, it came up for consideration.
The Ohio Republicans had already sounded the keynote
for the Senate debate by endorsing in their platform "the
steps now being taken by Congress and the President", and

139. Cong. 5ec., Yol. XXXI, Part 7, 55th Cong. 2d Sess.,
p. 6016—6018.
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by expressing an "urgent wish that the same be fully accom
plished at the earliest practicable date by the passage by
the Senate of the joint r e s o l u t i o n . A n n e x a t i o n i s t
sentiment was so strong that the opposition saw no chance
of escape unless through "filibustering". Three months of
deliberation had defeated the Hawaiian bill in the last
Senate and delay might be successful at this time.
general

In

the line of argument resembled that put forward

in the House. Senator Morrill of Vermont spent much time
in denouncing the reciprocity treaty of 1875, that "enor
mous blunder" which was the cause of the present trouble,
having encouraged the sugar barons to increase their ex
ports to the United States from twenty six million to
four hundred forty three million pounds.

This treaty

should have been terminated long ago, he believed, or at
least modified so as to have remitted not more than ten
or twenty per cent of the duties.

In addition he made a

strong point of the fact that Hawaii was not fit to become
a state.

Were it annexed, it could never be admitted to

the Union, he pointed out, for the varied races there would
never be fit for American citizenship and they could not
be driven out because their labor is indispensable. The
alternative, colonial government, is not very inviting ^?hen

140. The Nation, Yol. LXVI, p. 490.
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we look at the continuous strife in the colonies of other
countries,141

Senator Morrill was strongly supported by

William B. Bate of Tennessee.

Senator Bate opposed the

resolution on two grounds, the policy and the right of an
nexation.

Characterizing the action as an abandonment of

the Monroe Doctrine and the inauguration of an Oriental
policy, he denounced such a change on the ground that our
government was not fitted to administer it.

One of the

first steps would be the creation of a colonial depart
ment, the second, an increase in the army and navy#

This

great change would come as a result of a movement of
doubtful constitutionality, adopted because of its ex
pedience. "The entering wedge to a series of troubles in
our country which could not be controlled...in after
years," it might result in the control of our government
by the army, Mr. Bate feared.142
Senator Hoarfs stand as revealed on July 5, differed
somewhat from that of the majority#

The Nation said that

he was trying to oppose imperialism without cutting loose
from his party (the Republican) which had recently voted
almost unanimously for annexation in the House.

Then too,

he did not wish to take issue with the McKinley

141. Gong. Rec., Vol. XXXI, Part 7, 55th Cong. 2d Sess.,
p. 6141-6145.
142. Ibid., p. 6517-6528.

administration which was "pushing the scheme with utmost
14*!?
zeal*.
Not long before speaking, Senator Hoar had had
a conference with the President in which Mr. McKinley had
told him of the landing of Japanese emigrants with mili
tary training at Honolulu and of the evident determination
of Japan to secure the Islands, He went before the Senate
144
therefore, determined to outwit Japan.
Mr. Hoar began
by saying that while he opposed the acquisition of Cuba
or the Philippines from Spain, the fear of imperialism
was a needless alarm in the case of Hawaii.

This question

is not one of empire in the Pacific but of how far our
boundaries shall extend in the Hawaiian islands for we
already have Pearl Harbor. Having exercised doninion
over this group

for two generations, we now have a rela

tion to them that no one else can share and their annexa
tion would be "an extension of the domain of peace upon
the habitable globe.1*

It would not be right to annex

them in violation of the will of the people Mr. Hoar
agreed. However, as there has been no attempt to over
throw their government since the end of Mr. Cleveland*s
administration, it would seem that they acquiesce in the
change. The alternative will undoubtedly lead to Japanese
domination there through immigration, a move which the
143. The Nation. Tol. LX7II, p. 2.
144. Hoar, op. eit., Yol. II, p. 507-8.
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United States could never permit.

As "prevention is better

than cure", a peaceful settlement now is better than a fu
ture war between America and Asia over the Islands.

Yery

optimistically, Mr. Hoar concluded by propounding a rule
for solving the "greater and more dangerous problem which
145
is upon us in the near future":
"We will acquire no territory; we will ainex
no people; we will aspire to no empire or dominion*
except where we can reasonably expect that the
people we acquire will, in due time and on suitable
conditions, be annexed to the United States as an
equal part of a self-governing republic."
TIhe Senate by this time had grown weary of the debate
which was keeping them in Washington during the hot weather.
On July 6, 1898, they passed the joint resolution by a vote
of forty two to twenty one, and on July 8, it was approved
by President McKinley.

Bius the sugar planters reaped

the benefits of a century of American penetration in Hawaii
and the United States announced to Europe that she too, was
commencing a career of foreign economic imperialism.

145. Cong. Rec., Vol. X£XI, Part 7, 55th Cong. 2d Sess.,
p. 6660-6665.
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